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Economic Analysis and Evaluation of “Fair Prices”: Can Antitrust 
and International Taxation Lean from Each Other? 
Alessandro Turina & Nicolo Zingales* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Why should we be concerned about prices at all? According to the Chicago school of 
economics, markets ought to be left free from intervention simply because they will adjust 
themselves to the competitive price, and any form of intervention should be justified by 
analyzing the costs of action and proving the positive effects derived thereof1.  
A first, simple theoretical answer is that markets are in reality far from the level of 
perfection assumed by the traditional Chicago school of thought.  
A more practically concerned answer may be that pricing is one of the key issues in 
business economics, lying at crossroads between micro-economic theory and marketing 
strategies. Due to their lying directly at the core of any economic phenomenon, it should come as 
no surprise that prices are extremely sensitive variables also from an economic policy making 
perspective.  
Prices, costs and profit margins are clearly interrelated, as, provided two of these basic 
data, the third can also be inferred. Based on this arithmetic evidence, it should first be made 
clear that when we speak about price analysis, we are also in a way speaking of costs and profit 
margins.  
For public authorities, exerting any form of control or monitoring over any of such 
economic variables means touching the very heart of a market economy. As we have established 
why prices are so important from a public policy point of view, we may still wonder what areas 
of public policy intervention may directly impact on such economic indicators and on the 
grounds of which agenda. 
The two areas of public economic policy that are more directly interested in such issues 
appear being tax policy and competition policy. Even though the purposes with which these two 
areas focus their attention on this dimension, as it will be outlined in the following sections, are 
different, it seems to us that there must be, or there should be, a common denominator between 
the two, at least from a methodological view point. 
Typically, comparative law mostly adopts a territorially driven approach, that is, it tries to 
investigate how and why legal models circulate from one jurisdiction to another often leading to 
* Alessandro Turina (alessandro.turina@taxworks.it), Nicolo Zingales (nicolo.zingales@phd.unibocconi.it), Ph.D.
Candidates in International Economic Law, Bocconi University, Milan 
1 R.H. COASE, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, in  (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics, 1. 
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cases of “legal transplants”2. Our “comparative” concern is different, as we would like to focus 
our enquiry on whether any form of cross-pollination can be foreseen between different areas of 
law and policy making, even within the boundaries of the same jurisdictions.  
Generally, such dynamics are not unheard of and occur under the form of hierarchical 
cross references to legal concepts within a legal system, so that, for instance, when talking about 
tax law or competition law, we may not do without referring to concepts elaborated in private 
law, company law and international law. This kind of mechanism typically features a vertical 
dynamic, from the most general areas of law to the more specific ones. On the contrary, both tax 
law and competition law are very specialized fields of law; nonetheless, we still think that there 
might be some room for some degree of “horizontal” cross-pollination. Such cross-pollination 
basically revolves around a confrontation between the mechanisms adopted in different areas of 
law with respect to the handling of similar problems3. 
It should come as no surprise that both tax law and competition law are the areas of law 
that probably rely to the greatest extent on economic concepts. In this context, what the law tries 
to accomplish is to "translate" economic concepts in a legal jargon, determining their 
implications and establishing legal hurdles that facilitate the judicial mastering of economic 
complexities.  
The most obvious areas where tax law and competition law concepts and vocabulary 
intermingle is probably the topic of State Aid, to which the case law of the European Court of 
Justice has contributed to a wide extent. However, there are possibly other areas of public 
economic policy where tax and competition law are close to each other, at least from a 
methodological and procedural viewpoint: one of these areas is precisely what we broadly name 
“price-based analysis”. 
This paper, then, is first and foremost, a methodological enquiry whose aim is to illustrate 
the methods adopted by tax policy makers when dealing with the issue of transfer pricing and by 
competition law regulators and courts when confronted with the controversial issues of excessive 
pricing and predatory pricing.  
Based on such an exposition, which is carried out respectively in the three central 
sections of this paper, a comparative analysis - in the peculiar sense we have exposed above - is 
attempted. 
Such comparative analysis is carried out both by cross references in the individual 
sections of this paper as well as in the concluding remarks. 
What emerges from this enquiry is that “price based analysis”, either tax policy or 
competition policy driven, implies some compelling methodological questions that, at least in 
our view, are far from being settled and that, in summary terms, revolve around the fuzzy 
concept of “comparability”.  
                                                
2 The expression “legal transplant”, which has encountered long-lasting fortune in the realm of comparative law was 
originally elaborated in W.A.J. WATSON, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, Edinburgh, 2004. 
3 For a definition of the “triad” consisting of “models”, “problems” and “mechanisms” in a tax setting see C. 
GARBARINO, An Evolutionary Approach to Comparative Taxation: Methods and Agenda for Research, 2009, 4. 
The paper can be accessed on the following website: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1116686. 
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Furthermore, both areas of enquiry seem to have something to learn from each other from 
a procedural point of view with respect to general issues of legal certainty, per se legality, the 
allocation of the burden of proof and the dialectics between public authorities and private firms. 
 
II. SECTION 1: TRANSFER PRICING 
 
 
A. THE ROLE OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TRANSFER PRICING 
 
Within the context of a multinational group (hereinafter, M.N.E.), transfer prices are 
those prices that refer to intra-group transfers of goods, both tangible and intangible, and supplies 
of services.  In the current globalised economic order, where M.N.E.s play a pivotal role, intra-
group dealing account for more than 70% of cross-border world trade4.  
Such a central role has made transfer pricing a subject of enquiry not only for business 
economics and tax policy analysts, but also for international economics, even though an 
assessment of this latter dimension falls outside of the scope of this paper. 
It is generally understood that the adoption of transfer pricing legislation has historically 
been driven by the concern to prevent cross-border tax avoidance5, nonetheless the implications 
arising from transfer pricing issues are so pervasive that it can be pointed out that transfer pricing 
that lies at the heart of the international tax regime6. 
It appears quite clearly that the basic mean by which residence-based taxation can be 
avoided is by shifting income from residents to non residents.  The easiest way by which a 
M.N.E. can achieve this task is by manipulating transfer prices. 
Namely, a M.N.E., at least at its more developed stage can be qualified as a multinational 
group of independent legal entities, incorporated under the laws of different States and typically 
having their tax residence in different States7. At the same time, a multinational group represents 
a unitary economic entity. 
From a tax perspective, it is then possible to pursue what could be defined as an arbitrage 
between the economic unitary dimension of a multinational group and its juridical atomization: 
                                                
4 P. KRUGMAN, M. OBSTFELD, International Economics. Theory and Policy, VIII Edition, Boston, 2008, 134. 
5 C. CHOE, C.E. HYDE, Multinational Transfer Pricing, Tax Arbitrage and the Arm’s Length Principle, 2004, 1. 
This paper can be accessed on the following website: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=600881. 
6 See R. AVI YONAH, International Tax as International Law. An Analysis of the International Tax Regime, 
Cambridge, 2007,  102. By “international tax regime” the Author intends a coherent set of rules, both treaty based 
and domestic which constitute a corpus reaching the status of customary international law, to the extent that 
Countries would not be free to adopt any international tax rules as they see fit, but rather operate within the 
boundaries of said international tax regime. Contra, see H.D. ROSENBLOOM, ‘International Tax Arbitrage and the 
“International Tax System”’, (2000) 137 Tax L. Rev., 164. 
7 See D. VAGTS, ‘The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law’, (1970) 4, Harv. L. Rev., 
742. 
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on one hand, it is possible to shift income from one Country to another, taking care that profits 
accrue to lower tax jurisdictions while the matching expenses be borne by entities situated in 
higher tax jurisdictions; on the other hand, the unitary economic dimension of a multinational 
group allows for a consolidation of the tax benefits arising from the above described income 
shifting technique, without affecting the global economic performance of the group. 
Assuming that there were some form of tax coordination or ex post revenue sharing 
between the Countries where the group subsidiaries are situated, the above described scheme 
would be neutral also to the Treasuries of the concerned Countries. As it is well known, this is 
however not the case, not even in otherwise relatively integrated regional organizations such as 
the European Union. 
In the following Paragraphs, the key introductory issues in transfer pricing will be 
addressed with the attempt to provide a sound background for interdisciplinary discussion. At the 
same time, cross references to comparable issues to be found in the realm of competition law in 
relation to excessive pricing and predatory pricing analysis will be made when appropriate. 
 
 
B. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN TRANSFER PRICING LEGISLATION 
 
The oldest form of national transfer pricing legislation is to be found in the United States 
and dates back in its archetypal form to World War I “War Revenue Act”8, even though key 
issues such as the definition of what should be considered as an arm’s length benchmark was 
introduced only in the late 30’s9 . 
On the other hand, with the exception of some Anglo - Saxon Countries10, most tax 
jurisdictions did not encompass specific transfer pricing rules.  
Nonetheless, the fundamental conceptual tool to transfer pricing, the arm’s length 
principle has been embedded since 1963 in the OECD Model Convention under Art. 9 and has 
thus encountered a wide circulation in the majority of double taxation treaty networks.  
In 1979, the OECD assumed the task to provide guidance with respect to the application 
and interpretation of the arm’s length principle, thus setting forth a common standard in transfer 
pricing matters encapsulated in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and Tax Administrations. The 1979 version of the OECD Guidelines has ever since 
been updated in 1995, 2000 and, most recently, in 2009. 
As it will be outlined further on in this paper, despite the globalised nature of transfer 
pricing, which much owes to the balanced compromise represented by the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines, a tension clearly exists between the US approach to the subject, more 
thoroughly developed and which attributes a greater role to profit – based outlooks11 and what 
could be defined as the Continental approach to transfer pricing, represented in particular by the 
                                                
8 1917 War Revenue Act, Regulation 41, Art. 77 -78. 
9 1935 Treasury Regulations, Section 45 -1. 
10 Most notably, the United Kingdom and Canada. 
11 In particular, the Comparable Profits Method, introduced with the 1994 Regulations. 
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German and the Swedish legislation, more faithful to the original transaction based methods of 
the 1979 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
 
 
C. METHODS TO DETERMINE THE ARM’S LENGTH PRICE 
 
1. HISTORICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF THE APPLICATION OF THE ARM’S LENGTH STANDARD 
 
The first appearance of the expression “dealing at arm’s length” in international tax 
policy circles is not clear. 
The most consolidated historical reconstruction12 in this respect suggests that the use of 
this expression has its roots in the United States, with the first formal reference in the US 
Treasury Regulations of 1935. 
From a purely legal history perspective, the entry of what could have remained an 
isolated national tax concept  into the international tax koinè can only be understood by making 
reference to a Survey concerning the issue of the taxation of foreign and national enterprises 
drafted by the Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations under the chairmanship of Mitchell B. 
Carroll. The report also included a seminal reference to the emerging issue of transfer pricing, as 
it called for “an enquiry into the relations between the local branch and other establishments of 
the parent enterprise, which involve (…) consideration of the price at which goods have been 
invoiced and the amounts charged for services (…) or representing a portion of general 
overhead expenses”13. 
When the Fiscal Committee was asked to draft a model multilateral treaty concerning the 
issue of the allocation of business profits, the 1933 Multilateral Model, a forerunner to the 
current version of Art. 9 of the OECD Model was included, foreseeing the possibility that Tax 
Authorities may make adjustments in situations where related enterprises practiced conditions 
different from those which would have been made by independent enterprises. 
Ever since, through the mediation of further model conventions drafted by the Fiscal 
Committee of the League of Nations, of which the last version, agreed upon during a London 
round of meetings in 1946, came to be known as the “London Model”, the idea that the cross - 
border transactions between related enterprises had to be monitored and subject to enquiry 
passed right into the 1963 OECD Model Convention with the formulation of Art. 914.  
                                                
12 See, in particular, H. HAMAEKERS, ‘Arm’s Length – How Long?’, (2001) 3, I.T.P.J., 32. 
13 M.B. CARROLL et Al., Taxation of Foreign and National Enterprises, Volume IV , Geneva, 1933, 132, reported 
by H. HAMAEKERS, supra note, 31 
14 The 1963 version of Art. 9 of the OECD Model Convention read as follows: “Where a) an enterprise of a 
Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an enterprise of the 
other Contracting State, or b) the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control or 
capital of an enterprise of a Contracting State and an enterprise of the other Contracting State, and in either case 
conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ 
from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those 
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The root of the arm’s length principle is then grounded in a specific provision of the 
OECD Model Convention as well as in the analogous provision of the UN Model. 
Nonetheless, the enunciation of the arm’s length principle was set forth in such broad 
terms that a general consensus emerged at an OECD level for the drafting of more detailed 
guidelines outlining the concrete application of the arm’s length principle.  
 
2. FROM ONE STANDARD TO FIVE (AND MORE) METHODS 
 
 
2.1 Transaction based methods 
 
In 1979, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs and the Council of Ministers of the OECD 
adopted a Report (hereinafter, the 1979 Report) which provided guidelines to tax administrations 
and M.N.E.s on the concrete implementation of the arm’s length principle. 
The 1979 Report recommended three transfer pricing methods: 
 the “comparable uncontrolled price” method (hereinafter, C.U.P. 
method)15; 
 the “cost plus” method16; 
 the “resale price” method17. 
These methods are generally defined under the umbrella term “transaction based 
methods”. 
The C.U.P. method is based on a comparison between the comparable controlled 
transaction, that is the infra-group transaction which is under scrutiny and the comparable 
uncontrolled transaction which may have taken place either between an entity included in the 
multinational group and a third party or between third parties unaffiliated with the multinational 
group. 
Comparability requires that no difference in the compared transactions nor between the 
enterprises that carry out said transactions be such to influence the arm’s length price. If this is 
not the case, such difference may be eliminated by resorting to the appropriate adjustments. 
It is widely recognized that the C.U.P. method faces particular implementation 
difficulties as it is not always easy to find adequately comparable transactions. In these cases, it 
is possible to resort to the other two transaction-based methods, such as the resale price and cost 
plus method. 
                                                                                                                                                       
conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be 
included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly.” 
15 Currently disciplined by Para. 2.18 – 2.24  in the 2009 version of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (hereinafter, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines). 
16 Currently disciplined by Para. 2.25 – 2.42 of the 2009 version of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
17 Currently disciplined by Para. 2.43 – 2.59 of the 2009 version of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
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The “resale price” method is based on the assumption that the arm’s length price equals 
the resale price at which a product that has been bought by a related seller is sold to an unrelated 
party minus a profit margin. Said profit margin should be such to offset the operating expenses 
borne by the reseller – on the grounds of the kind of activity and of the functions carried out, of 
the  assets deployed and of the risks undertaken – and to incorporate an adequate share of profits 
for the reseller. 
The “cost plus” method is based on the assumption that the arm’s length price equals the 
cost of production augmented by a profit margin determined by multiplying the production costs 
by a given markup. Such mark up encompasses the value of the functions to be fulfilled by the 
parties and the size of the risk to be borne, including, for example, guarantees, market risk, 
foreign exchange risk and  is related to the value of the functions to be fulfilled.  The mark up 
should be determined by operating a comparison with comparable transactions conducted by the 
group entities with third parties or between third parties external to the group. 
The cost plus method is typically applied with reference to infra-group transactions 
revolving around semi-manufactured products that undergo an easily apportionable addition of 
value through the production pipeline. 
It has been remarked that the “cost plus method” is the transaction based method which 
more apparently departs from the general and traditional understanding of the arm’s length 
standard in a purely transaction based setting, to the extent that it may be considered much closer 
to one of the profit based methods18 that will be outlined in the following paragraphs.  
The same conclusion may be extended also to the “resale price” method, as it seems quite 
intuitive to see a close connection between the cost plus method and the resale price method, to 
the extent the two appear almost being reversed variants of the very same conceptual approach19. 
Such a circumstance would seem to validate the thesis according to which the distinction 
between transaction based and profit based methods is a conventional one, as a continuum where 
different methods fade into each other – from strictly transaction based C.U.P. to profit split 
methods – can be envisaged, rather than a juxtaposition20. 
The 1979 Report did not exclude the application of other methods21, such as the profit 
split method. At the same time, the 1979 Report clearly stated that implementation approaches 
                                                
18 A. CASLEY, ‘The Basic Framework of the Cost Plus Method’, (1999) 3 I.T.P.J., 44 
19 See R. AVI YONAH, supra note 6, 105 
20 In this sense, R. AVI YONAH, The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length. A Study in the evolution of U.S. International 
Taxation,  2006, University of Michigan Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper, No. 07 – 017, 2. The paper can be 
accessed on the following website: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017524. The Author states 
that such continuum also includes formulary methods at one of the extreme opposite ends. This view is however 
generally disputed, to the extent that the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines openly characterize formulary 
apportionment as a non arm’s length method. In this respect, since this section of this paper focuses in particular of 
an exposition of the arm’s length standard in order to set the background for debate between a tax law perspective 
on the subject and a competition law one, formulary apportionment will not be addressed. For a thorough and 
sympathetic contribution concerning the fundamentals of this methodology see, ex multis, W. HELLERSTEIN, ‘The 
Case for Formulary Apportionment’, (2005) 5 I.T.P.J., 103. 
21 This openness applies also to later versions of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
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based on the comparison of net profits could not be considered applicable outside of a general 
prima facie screening method for tax administrations22. 
All the three aforementioned transaction – based transfer pricing methods that had been 
incorporated in the OECD 1979 Report were earlier developed in the United States. The original 
reference was to be found in the 1968 Regulations referring to Section 482 of the Internal 
Revenue Code (hereinafter, IRC) and originally focused on the transfer of tangible property, 
even though the concrete implementation of such methods was progressively shaped in the 
following decade. 
 
2.2 The rise of profit based methods 
 
Over the years, capitalizing on the creative outcomes of case law, alternative approaches 
to the actual implementation of the arm’s length principle led to a flourishing of alternative 
methodological proposals23.  
Moreover, the amendment of Sec. 482 of the “Internal Revenue Code” (hereinafter, 
I.R.C.) set forth by the 1986 US Tax Reform also promoted a discussion on new transfer pricing 
methods. In particular, in 1988, the idea that new methods centered on the comparison of 
operating profits was set forth in a “White Paper”24 where a “basic arm’s length return” method 
(hereinafter, B.A.R.L.M.) was outlined and whose application was advocated with respect to 
transactions involving the transfer of intangibles. B.A.R.L.M. basically consisted in determining 
an  appropriate return for the use of an intangible transferred within a multinational enterprise by 
applying industry-wide return rates to the assets and functions performed by the parties to the 
actual transactions25. 
It has been remarked that the “White Paper” represented an apparent downturn of the 
application of traditional comparability methods as, in many instances, the traditional transaction 
based methods had proven to be inapplicable, as no comparables could be found26. The seminal 
proposals contained in the “White Paper” were then instrumental in promoting an “expanded 
definition of the arm’s length standard”27. In particular, instead of embracing a theoretical top 
down approach, often detached from the practical problems arising from a narrow and dogmatic 
take on the arm’s length principle, a bottom up perspective was adopted: a transfer pricing 
continuum was somewhat defined, starting from the traditional and often unworkable C.U.P. to 
                                                
22 See in particular Para. 71 of the 1979 OECD Report 
23 For an overview, see H.D. ROSENBLOOM, ‘The U.S. Approach to Transfer Pricing: Benchmarks and 
Hallmarks’, (2006) 2 Fiscalità Internazionale, 135 
24 I.R.S. Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 458, 475 
25 For an overview of B.A.L.R.M., see D. FRISCH, ‘The BALRM Approach of Transfer Pricing’, (1989) 3 Nat'l Tax 
J., 261 
26 See R. KAPLAN, ‘International Tax Enforcement and the Special Challenge of Transfer Pricing’, (1990) 319 U. 
Ill. L. Rev., 299.  
27 R. AVI YONAH, supra note 20, 14. 
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profit split methods; any take on this ideal thread could be considered acceptable as long as the 
deriving outcome was compatible with arm’s length results28. 
The 1988 “White Paper” eventually evolved into a formal amendments to the existing 
regulations in 1994. The amended Regulations concerning Section 482 of the IRC covered the 
whole transfer pricing matter and saw the introduction of two new formalized methods: 
 the comparable profits method; 
 the profit split method. 
The comparable profits method (hereinafter, C.P.M.) was centered on the assessment of 
the operating profit that the tested party would have earned from intra-group transactions if its 
profit level indicators (most typically, the E.B.I.T., “Earnings Before Interest and Taxes” ) were 
equal to those realized by an uncontrolled comparable party29. The main detachment from the 
traditional transaction based methods consisted in the circumstance that the considered profit 
level indicators are those referred to the controlled taxpayer’s more narrowly identifiable 
business activity encompassing the controlled transactions. As a consequence, an arm’s length 
range may be defined if more than one reliable arm’s length result become available30. 
In particular, with respect to the application of the C.P.M.,  an arm’s range is defined in 
the interval between the 25th and the 75th percentile, outside of which, the IRS is entitled to apply 
adjustments. This approach has been subject to some criticism due to the fact that it is very 
sensitive to the managerial accounting policies adopted by the company. Nonetheless, its 
flexibility and the fact that it can be applied without embarking on complex property and 
services comparability analysis or functional analysis; this has made the C.P.M. the preferred 
method adopted by the IRS. At the same time, at a scholarly level, the C.P.M. has been subject to 
both criticism and praise. In particular, it has been held that C.P.M. tends to lead to a form of 
presumptive taxation31. On the other hand, C.P.M. has also been praised for its “hands on” 
approach to transfer pricing and its suitability for being applied to modern business32.  
It has also been remarked that asserting that the C.P.M. is at irreconcilable variance with 
the arm’s length principle may not be sustainable, since the different transfer pricing methods 
represent different spots on a continuum which goes from C.U.P. and its strictly transactional 
approach to the C.P.M. that, if one hand falls outside the traditional notions of arm’s length 
under some respects, it still incorporates some elements of comparability analysis, which is 
probably the real core concern of any arm’s length transfer pricing reasoning. The fact that 
C.P.M. is based on aggregated profits rather than transactions should not be seen as an exception, 
since, as it has been already exposed, also traditional methods such as the “cost plus” and the 
“resale price” method refer, in the definitive, to profit level indicators33. 
                                                
28In this sense, D. FRISCH, ‘Comments on the Proposed US Regulations on Transfer Pricing from an Economic 
Perspective’, (1992) 3 Intertax, 340. 
29 H. HAMAEKERS, ‘The Comparable Profits Method and the Arm’s Length Principle’, (2003) 5 I.T.P.J., 90. 
30 D. OOSTERHOFF, J. P. DONGA, ‘Practical Application of Transactional Profits Methods’, (2001) 1 I.T.P.J., 5. 
31 In this sense,  H. HAMAEKERS, supra note 29, 91. 
32 In this sense, R. AVI YONAH, supra note 6, 117. 
33 D. OOSTERHOFF, J. P. DONGA, supra note 30, 1. 
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On the other hand, the profit split method departed even more significantly from the 
traditional arm’s length methods as it implied for a two step process. The first phase consists in 
an assessment of the functions performed by each of the related parties and the subsequent 
allocation of a market rate of return allocated to each function on the basis of comparables. A 
second phase transcends the very notion of comparability, as the residual profit is eventually split 
between the related parties on the grounds of a formula. In this respect, it appears quite clearly 
that the profit split method also incorporates a formulary apportionment component, even though 
no specific formula is used. 
A few months after the new 1994 US Regulations were adopted, the OECD responded 
with the finalization of a new set of Transfer Pricing Guidelines in 1995. The 1995 OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines represented a compromise, as they tried to render the C.P.M. 
developed in the United States more acceptable also to European Countries (in particular, 
Germany and Sweden) that were rather skeptical about it, due to the fact that they thought that 
C.P.M. conflicted with the arm’s length principle encapsulated in Art. 9 of the OECD Model 
Convention34. In this respect, it would seem that the OECD was not very successful, as, even 
nowadays, Germany does not fully endorse profit – based transfer pricing methods35. 
In particular, the OECD set forth a partial alternative to C.P.M. going under the name of 
“Transactional Net Margin” method (hereinafter, T.N.M.M.). Like C.P.M., the T.N.M.M. is 
based on a comparison of operating profits, even though T.N.M.M. should be applied transaction 
by transaction rather than at an aggregated level36. 
From an implementation viewpoint, the profit level indicator more commonly adopted 
are the E.B.I.T. on sales, E.B.I.T. on total costs or E.B.I.T. on total assets (also known as the 
“R.O.A.” - return on assets – ratio). 
As in other transfer pricing methodologies, comparability plays a key role. Namely, the 
net margin realized by group entities with respect to specific infra-group transactions should be 
compared with the net margins realized by entities dealing at arm’s length. In this respect, 
tracking down different transactions by macro-categories and defining the actual content of the 
transaction (e.g., pure sale vs. sale and provision of some additional services) is a key factor in 
the actual implementation of the T.N.M.M.. 
The earlier mentioned focus on transactions is quite understandable bearing in mind the 
historical development of the arm’s length principle; at  the same time, such a concern seems to 
be an attempt to reconcile the non-reconcilable. The very expression “transfer pricing methods” 
which, before anything else, are actually pricing criteria that M.N.E.s should follow when setting 
prices, the perspective is thus ex ante. Profits based methods, on the contrary, are by their very 
nature based on  ex post considerations, as these methods are not suitable to settle prices in 
advance but, rather, serve as a sanity check when analyzing or checking out the outcomes of 
transactions, which may then be considered at an aggregate level. How to combine profit based 
                                                
34 H. HAMAEKERS, supra note 12, 31. 
35 ERNST & YOUNG, Global Transfer Pricing Survey, 2009. The survey can be accessed on the following website: 
http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/Tax/2009-Global-Transfer-Pricing-survey. 
36 For an in depth comparative analysis of C.P.M. and T.N.M.M., see A.CASLEY, A. KRITIKIDES, ‘Transactional 
Net Margin Method, Comparable Profits Methods and the Arm’s Length Principle’, (2003) 9 I.T.P.J., 162. 
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methods with a focus on transactions, as advocated by the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 
appears then to be a conundrum37.  
 
D. THE ISSUE OF COMPARABILITY: AN ENLARGED PERSPECTIVE 
 
In the definitive, apart from the C.U.P. method, all transfer pricing methods seem to rely 
on the comparison between profit margins realized in infra-group transactions with profit 
margins realized between parties dealing at arm’s length. 
In this respect, transfer pricing is a conceptual tool mostly revolving around comparing 
economic indicators, in this respect the issue of comparability assumes a key place in the whole 
transfer pricing conceptual framework.  
It should be remarked that the issue of comparability is one of the items which are 
common both to the transfer pricing for tax agenda and the excessive pricing and predatory 
pricing agenda falling into the purview of competition law. 
Comparability appears as a logical process having an eminently economic content whose 
purpose is to ensure that the economically relevant characteristics of the situations being 
compared be adequately comparable, whereas being comparable means that none of the possible 
differences between the situations being compared could materially affect the condition being 
examined in the light of a given transfer pricing methodology. 
In direct connection to the comparability analysis we find the adjustments that allow an 
actual comparability between the transactions under scrutiny and those assumed as a term of 
comparison in a sort of “comparative statics” approach.  
In this respect, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines recommend that when establishing 
whether there is comparability between the situations being compared and the adjustments 
deemed as necessary, Tax Authorities should take into account a number of variables 
representing the foreseeable economic differences that may require the adoption of adjustments. 
Depending which transfer pricing methodology is adopted the comparability analysis can 
assume as its point of reference either prices or profit margins.  
On any account, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines do not endorse a purely stylized  
statistical approach to the issue of comparability, as it has on the contrary been also set forth in 
literature38. Namely, a purely statistically based approach to the issue of comparability would 
leave no room for the carrying out of qualitative case – by - case adjustments39, as it is on the 
contrary recommended by the very OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, since, “in no event can 
unadjusted industry average returns themselves establish arm’s length conditions”40. 
                                                
37 See P. FRIS, ‘Dealing with Arm’s Length and Comparability in the Years 2000’, (2003) 11 I.T.P.J., 195. 
38 See J. VAN DER MEER – KOOISTRA, ‘A Model for Making Qualitative Transfer Pricing Adjustments’, (2004) 
9 I.T.P.J., 190. 
39 P. FRIS, supra note 37, 202. 
40 See  Para. 1.16 2009 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
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The key variables to be examined within the context of a comparability analysis can thus 
be summarized as follows: 
 the characteristics of property or services41; 
 functional analysis42; 
 contractual terms43; 
 economic circumstances44; and 
 business strategies45. 
While a thorough analysis of all the aforementioned different dimensions constituting 
part to the comparability analysis would go beyond the scope of this paper, we would like to 
focus on two of the aforementioned aspects, due to their proximity to similar problems 
encountered in the domain of competition law with respect to the matters of excessive pricing 
and predatory pricing. 
Comparability analysis necessarily takes into account how markets affect the infra-group 
transactions under scrutiny. In this respect, it is required that the markets in which the 
independent and associated enterprises operate are comparable and that the differences do not 
have a material effect on price46. 
In order to conduct an assessment of the market conditions for comparability analysis 
purposes, it is first of all necessary to identify the relevant market taking into account 
merceological characterizations. Further elements to be ascertained include the geographical 
location47, the economic cycles48, the size of the market, the competitive forces operating in the 
market and the actual relative competitive positions occupied in such markets by the buyers and 
the sellers. Further elements to be taken into account in the market segmentation are the 
endogenous and exogenous forces that shape such markets, as, for instance, the purchasing 
powers of the consumers, the degree of regulation of the market, the different stages of the 
commercialization pipeline (e.g., wholesale Vs. retail)49.  
Another key element to be taken into account and that is particularly relevant for the 
purposes of our joint enquiry is how costs of production and commercialization (including, for 
instance, transportation costs) are taken into account.  
                                                
41 This issue is covered by Para. 1.19 of the 2009 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
42 This issue is covered by Paras. 1.20 – 1.27 of the 2009 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
43 This issue is covered by Paras. 1.28 -129 of the 2009 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
44 This issue is covered by Para. 1.30 of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
45 This issue is covered by Para. 1.31 of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
46 In such cases, the adequate adjustments should be performed. 
47 In this respect, the 2009 version of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines openly admit the use of a multiple-
country comparability analysis. 
48 Reference to this variable has been added only in the 2009 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines at Para. 1.55. 
49 These latter elements were introduced by the 2000 version of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
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A second aspect of comparability analysis, which acquires greater relevance from a joint 
tax law and competition law perspective is the ascertainment of how business strategies are 
factored in when conducting a comparability analysis for transfer pricing purposes. 
In this respect, it may result beneficial to make reference to the underlying 
microeconomic background to the matter, that is, how companies are expected to determine 
inter-company prices regardless of exogenous legal constraints. 
Standard economic theory tells us that such transactions should be conducted at marginal 
cost: such a marginal cost rule will eliminate any inefficiencies arising from double 
marginalization.50.  On the other hand, for multinational firms with affiliates operating in 
different tax jurisdictions, transfer prices serve more than tracking internal transactions for 
managerial accounting purpose, as they also determine tax liability of affiliates in different 
countries, hence the overall tax liability of the multinational enterprise.  
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines on this point do not seem to be very open to 
welcome insights from microeconomic pricing theory; on the contrary, the US 1988 “White 
Paper” contained a short chapter on economic theories concerning the implementation of Section 
482 of the IRC where it adopts a reversed approach, stating that arm’s length transactions could 
be reconstructed by looking at the arrangements unrelated parties would have made if they could 
choose to have the costs of related parties51.  
One of the few purely microeconomic aspects the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
openly take into account, although from a business strategy perspective, is the issue of market 
penetration pricing strategies, as reference is made to a situation where an M.N.E. is in such a 
position to be willing to penetrate a market or to increase its market share by temporarily 
charging a price for its products which is lower than the price for otherwise comparable products 
in the same market. Similarly, it is recognized that a taxpayer seeking to enter a new market may 
incur in start – up costs that may temporarily hinder its profitability. In this respect, Tax 
Administrations are asked to evaluate whether such business strategies are actually being 
implemented or are used only as a cover up and whether the adopted strategy can be plausibly 
expected to be profitable in the future and that parties at arm’s length would have been prepared 
to sacrifice pro tempore profitability in order to better deal with the competitive structure of the 
markets.  According to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines it is also relevant to ascertain 
whether the nature of the relationship between the parties to the controlled transaction would be 
consistent with the taxpayer bearing the cost of the business strategy. 
Another interesting issue to be examined from an interdisciplinary perspective is the use 
of adjustments in order to neutralize the effects of possible government intervention policies. 
According to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, among such forms of government 
intervention policies we also find forms of price controls. 
Whether competition law - backed forms of price assessment such as excessive pricing or 
predatory pricing monitoring are also to be accounted among the government intervention 
policies to be factored in when implementing comparability adjustments for transfer pricing 
purposes is an issue that seems to have been ignored so far both in literature and in guidelines. 
                                                
50 See J. HIRSHLEIFER, ‘On the Economics of Transfer Pricing’, (1956) 9 Journal of Business, 178. 
51 Reported by R. AVI YONAH, supra note 20, 26. 
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There is no doubt that, in general terms, all forms of government interventions should be 
accounted for among other “conditions of the market” of a given Country or set of Countries. If 
such conclusion is quite apparent for forms of direct government intervention, such as actual 
price controls, on the other hand, the same kind of effects could derive in the long run from ex 
ante economic policy regulations, to which many competition law provisions can be ascribed. 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines set forth that in order to conduct a suitable 
comparability analysis for transfer pricing purposes it is necessary to ascertain the stage at which  
price controls affects the price of the products sold by the company or of the services supplied 
and whether the impact of such policies impact only on the final consumer or also on other actors 
on the supply chain. 
While “hard constraints” deriving from price controls can be easily isolated, the 
constraints deriving from indirect forms of control embodied, for instance, by the European 
excessive pricing rules, are very difficult to quantify but it would not be inconsistent with the 
general framework of comparability analysis to hold the view that they should be weighted in. 
 
E. DRIVERS BEHIND THE CHOICE OF A TRANSFER PRICING METHOD 
 
The 1995 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines departed from their US counterpart on a 
key issue, the hierarchy or – more aptly said – the criterion of choice for endorsing a 
methodology over another. 
Namely,  the 1994 US Transfer Pricing Regulations established the admissibility of all 
the five above described methods and, at the same time, saw the introduction of the so-called 
“best method” rule, according to which the method that should be eventually endorsed is the one 
which best approximates the arm’s length price and imports the fewest adjustments to the 
comparables52.  
Thus, in the choice of the best method, two key criteria have to be factored in: 
 the comparability with the free market situation; 
 the quality of the gathered data as well as of the underlying assumptions. 
On the other hand, the 1995 OECD Guidelines adopted an approach which was at once 
more liberal and vaguer, as they did not provide, in practice, and effective criterion for sorting 
out different methods and for defining a hierarchy among them so to pre-emptively settle 
disputes between tax administration holding different views on which method is preferable. 
At the same time, it seems to us that the US “best method” approach is also not 
thoroughly endorsable. It may be true that a questionable criterion is better than no criterion at 
all, but the “best method” approach seems to carry along some remarkable pitfalls, which can 
summarized in the simple observation that such rule implies the tentative pre-emptive 
investigation of all of the specified methods53.  
                                                
52 R. AVI YONAH, supra note 6, 114. 
53 H. HAMAEKERS, supra note 29, 92. 
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On the other hand, the OECD has indeed established a ranking of preferences, constantly 
affirming over the different versions of its transfer pricing Guidelines that the arm’s length is 
central to the transfer pricing system and that formulary approaches such as formulary 
apportionment would then be at variance with the principles governing international taxation, of 
which the arm’s length standard is a key criterion54. 
Within the context of the codified methods it was also still possible to derive a preference 
given by the Fiscal Affairs Committee to transaction based methods as opposed to profit based 
methods55. 
Nonetheless, such ranking appears to be of scarce practical relevance, as in some cases 
M.N.E.s do not really have a choice in finding the applicable transfer pricing methodology. In 
some cases, transactional methods may be applicable but much more burdensome to fine tune 
than their profit based counterparts. In this case, the hierarchy set forth by the OECD Guidelines 
would be of no help but may rather create further difficulties for M.N.E.s. 
The issue of the hierarchy between different transfer pricing methods has encountered a 
remarkable deviation following to the update of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines which 
took place in 2009. In particular, the exceptionality associated with the transactional profit based 
methods has been overcome and a new functional standard has been set forth, according to 
which, the selected transfer pricing method should be the most appropriate method to the 
circumstances of the case. How such a qualification interacts with the best profit method adopted 
in the US is a matter that will likely rise the attention of future commentators. 
Nonetheless, the 2009 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines clearly state that M.N.E.s 
cannot be expected to apply more than one transfer pricing methodology  and this would seem to 
exclude the need to counterproof the results obtained under the method of choice with other 
possible alternative applicable methods in order to ascertain whether the adopted method is the 
“best method”. Namely, the Guidelines clarify that while in some cases the selection of a method 
may not be straightforward and more than one method may be initially considered, it will be 
possible to select one method that is apt to provide the best estimation of an arm’s length price56. 
The new OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines generally state that “the respective strengths 
and weaknesses of each of the OECD recognised method should be taken into account”57; In 
particular, the new OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines further suggest the appropriateness of the 
method considered should be valued in the light of the following: 
 the nature of the controlled transaction, determined in particular through a 
functional analysis; 
 the availability of reasonably reliable information (in particular on 
uncontrolled comparables); 
 the degree of comparability of controlled and uncontrolled transactions 
(and the reliability of the comparability adjustments that may be needed to eliminate 
differences between them). 
                                                
54 In this sense,  J. OWENS, ‘Should the Arm’s Length Principle Retire?’, (2005) 5 I.T.P.J., 103. 
55 Reference should be made, in particular, to Para. 1.14 of the 1996 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
56 See Para. 2.10 of the 2009 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
57 See Para. 2.1 of the 2009 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
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The most apparent outcome of such an approach is that the aforementioned and 
traditional skepticism towards transactional profit based methods seems to have been overcome, 
mostly on the ground of pragmatic concerns. Even though the 2009 OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines clarify that transactional profit method may not be applied by default on the sole 
ground of the circumstance that data for adopting a transaction based method may be difficult to 
obtain58, it is recognized that, in some cases transactional profit methods may be more 
appropriate than transaction based methods59.  
 
 
F. PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
 
 
1. TRANSFER PRICING AND BURDEN OF PROOF 
 
Tax compliance practices vary from Country to Country depending on the respective 
administrative procedures and domestic legislation. A clear example is the issue of the transfer 
pricing documentation taxpayers are expected to provide to the tax administration in case a 
transfer pricing audit is conducted.  
The probating importance attributed to transfer pricing documentation varies 
considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; for instance, in the United States, the providing of 
contemporaneous documentation (i.e., documentation prepared ex ante) allows the taxpayer 
under tax audit to avoid being subject to penalties, while other Countries have not developed a 
consistent set of provisions concerning the probating relevance of transfer pricing 
documentation.  
In order to overcome such differences, the OECD has devoted a specific section of its 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines to the issue of documentation. This endeavor for harmonization is 
also mirrored at a regional level by the efforts carried out by the EU Joint Transfer Pricing 
Forum60 in the drafting of a “Code of Conduct of Transfer Pricing Documentation for Associated 
Enterprises in the EU”61 in 2006.  
While, with respect to the issue of documentation a general consensus has been reached, 
at least at an EU level, significant differences, often directly linked to the specificities of national 
                                                
58 See Para. 2.4 of the 2009 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
59 One of such cases may for instance be where, considering the functional analysis of the controlled transaction 
under review and an evaluation of the comparable uncontrolled transactions, it is found that a net profit margin 
analysis is more reliable than a gross margin analysis. 
60 The EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum is a Group of EU Experts endorsed and established by the European 
Commission in 2002. Members are drawn form the academia, business councils and tax administrations operating 
on a consensus basis whose task is to set forth non legislative proposals in the field of transfer pricing. Even though 
works are carried out in an EU perspective, the approaches adopted are expressly consistent with the Guidelines 
provided by the OECD. 
61 Code of Conduct of Transfer Pricing Documentation for Associated Enterprises in the EU, in OJ C176 of 28th July 
2006, 1 
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jurisdictions, exist in the realm of how the burden of proof shall be allocated in transfer pricing 
disputes. In broad terms, in transfer pricing audits, the ex post application of one of the transfer 
pricing methods in order to ascertain the arm’s length nature of a given transaction implies that 
the Tax Administration can rely on a presumption which is up to the taxpayer to controvert. In 
this respect, the burden of proof in transfer pricing matters is typically shifted on the taxpayer. At 
the same time, non rebuttable presumptions are typically not admitted. 
Due to the inherently bilateral nature of transfer pricing, most problems actually arise 
from the interaction between different jurisdictions. Even though transfer pricing is a fairly 
globalised matter in its conceptual architecture62, there is no homogeneity in the way different 
States actually determine the arm’s length nature of a given transaction and quantitatively 
determine the arm’s length prices or profit margins.  
Along with the difficulties deriving from the clash of different practical approaches to the 
matter, further problems arise from the fact that the ideal term of comparison of any transfer 
pricing audit, that is, prices or profit margins emerging from the arm’s length negotiations 
between actors operating in perfectly functioning markets is something that is rarely encountered 
in the real world. 
Beyond the formal aspects concerning the attribution of the burden of proof, flexibility 
should be endorsed also due to the circumstance that the proof in transfer pricing cannot be 
merely factual based but, rather, it implies a rational process centered on the correct 
understanding and application of principles that, in the definitive, rely on economic theories. In 
this respect, the elements of a correct understanding of the economic conceptual tools underlying 
to all transfer pricing regulations and methodologies, paired with a bona fide behavior from both 
actors against a share background of reasonability should be emphasized more at the expense of 
a formalistic approach to the attribution of the burden of proof63. 
As a pragmatic remedy to the uncertainty that characterizes the application of the arm’s 
length principle, the OECD, as well as, to various extents, national legislations set forth the 
proposal to adopt, in specific circumstances, an approach based on “safe harbors”, that is, on “ a 
simple set of rules under which transfer prices would be automatically accepted by the national 
tax administration”64.  
Safe harbors may be provided under different forms, however they can be referred to two 
main categories: 
 safe harbors implying the exclusion of certain transactions (e.g., those 
whose size is below a certain threshold) from the scope of application of transfer pricing 
legislation; 
 safe harbors implying the application of simplified transfer pricing rules 
(e.g., the individuation of ranges within which prices or profits shall fall in order to be 
presumed being compliant with the arm’s length principle). 
                                                
62 J. CALDERON, ‘The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines as a Source of Tax Law: Is Globalization Reaching the 
Tax Law?’, (2007) 1 Intertax, 4. 
63 In this sense, see C. GARBARINO, Manuale di tassazione internazionale, II Edition, Milano, 2008, 1209. 
64 See Para. 4.95 of the 1996 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
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2. ADVANCE PRICING AGREEMENTS 
 
Advance Pricing Agreements (hereinafter, A.P.A.s) represent the most striking 
innovation in the field of transfer pricing. As with the vast majority of transfer pricing conceptual 
tools and administrative solutions,  A.P.A.s originate in the United States and have subsequently 
been endorsed by the OECD65, then making their way in a number of jurisdictions. 
A.P.A.s, as the very name suggests, consist in a pre-emptive negotiation between 
taxpayers and one or more Tax Authorities and have the effect to minimize possible litigation 
costs for both parties. 
In this respect, the A.P.A. appears as a complex procedure finalized to reaching of “an 
arrangement that determines, in advance, of controlled transactions, an appropriate set of 
criteria for the determination of the transfer pricing of those transactions over a fixed period of 
time”66. 
A.P.A.s basically serve the function to integrate judicial and administrative instruments 
unilaterally foreseen by each domestic legislation by providing a platform suitable to anticipate 
the resolution of possible arising disputes. In this respect, A.P.A.s qualify as precious 
instruments that safeguard legal certainty and the expectations of M.N.E.s with respect to their 
tax planning strategies. A.P.A.s have then the merit of having introduced, at least in theory, an 
element of stabilization into an often unpredictable domain such as transfer pricing, as the arm’s 
length principle is often as much a vague concept as it is essential. 
Due to transfer pricing being a cross-border phenomenon, A.P.A.s can be unilateral, 
bilateral or multilateral; i.e., they can involve one, two or more tax administrations. The very 
OECD Guidelines on this matter are not enthusiastic about unilateral A.P.A.s as they are 
apparently not suitable to avoid possible cases of international double taxation, since the State 
having tax jurisdiction over the other counterpart to the transaction could disregard the terms set 
forth by the unilateral A.P.A. and put adjustments into place. 
The A.P.A. is a tax payer driven process, as it is foreseen that the taxpayer shall start 
proposing an agreement; preliminary meetings then ensure the possibility to evaluate the actual 
pros and cons of the agreement. 
On the other hand, the taxpayer is faced with specific responsibilities and duties: it is 
expected that the payer justifies the methods and the economic indicators of choice and that it 
adopts critical assumptions concerning the economic and operational scenarios that will occur at 
the time when transactions covered by the A.P.A. will actually take place. 
The basic elements that are constitutive of an A.P.A. are: 
 the perimeter of the transactions included in the scope of application of the 
A.P.A.; 
 the methodology to be adopted in order to assess the transactions covered by 
the A.P.A.; 
                                                
65 In this respect, an Appendix concerning how an A.P.A. should be implemented has been included in the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
66 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Annex 3, Para. 3. 
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 the selection of comparable transactions functional to the assessment of the 
transactions covered by the A.P.A. 
A.P.As are typically pro tempore agreements, whose extension is generally comprised 
between three and five years. In this respect, A.P.A.s, due to their limited temporal horizon have 
the advantage that they can be fine tuned on a regular basis.  
At an EU level, remarkable endeavors have been devoted by the EU Joint Transfer 
Pricing Forum in providing specific guidelines for the handling of A.P.A.s involving Tax 
Administrations of the Member States which have culminated in the setting forth of a 
Communication by the European Commission (COM(2007) 71 of 26th February 2007). The 
Communication does not cover only A.P.A.s but other forms of cooperation between Tax 
Administrations, such as simultaneous tax examinations on the assessment side and mediation 
and prior consultation procedures in the domain of the prevention of disputes.  
 
 
II. SECTION 2: EXCESSIVE PRICING 
 
A. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 
Excessive pricing is a broad concept that may refer to a variety of abuses of dominant 
position, under competition law:  it may be the result of an integrated company's plan to "squeeze 
out" its downstream competitor; it may be a strategy for an incumbent to "get around" a statutory 
duty to deal; or it may be, more simply, the constitutive element or the "flip-side" of price 
discrimination or bundling.  
At its most basic, however, excessive pricing may also constitute an abuse in and of itself 
to the extent that it can be identified as a prohibited "exploitative" conduct. The term 
"exploitative" is used as opposed to "exclusionary" to refer to situations where the dominant 
company exploits the other market participants without altering the structure of the market. Yet 
an important remark is that not all jurisdictions have enacted prohibitions against exploitative 
abuses:  these prohibitions are rather a peculiarity of the European Union and some other legal 
regimes (amongst others, many European Countries). By contrast, the United States in their long- 
standing antitrust history have always abstained from addressing exploitative conducts through 
competition law, letting price control aside as an exclusively regulatory matter. Perhaps one 
could infer from this respective feature of the antitrust regime that an important transatlantic 
divide exists over the degree to which a government is entitled to intervene in the market, in 
particular when it comes to challenging the pricing policy of a dominant firm in a non-regulated 
market. Such conclusion, however, might also be too quickly drawn: in fact, the practice shows 
that excessive pricing precedents at Community level have been rather limited both in number 
and in scope, tending to be focused on exclusionary rather than exploitative conduct. 
Nonetheless, the existence of such divide could still be found, admittedly, at the national level, 
having Regulation 1/2003 left open the possibility for Member States to establish stricter regimes 
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with respect to the treatment of dominant firms67.   
Investigating the broad range of excessive pricing regulations that are in the force at the 
national level would be a burdensome exercise, and is out of the scope of our inquiry. We will 
remain focused on excessive pricing cases decided by Community courts, more precisely 
limiting the inquiry to those cases where the allegation of abuse was based on exploitative -rather 
than exclusionary- conduct.  
In this respect, the most famous "pure" excessive pricing cases are General 
Motors68,United Brands69,  British Leyland70, SACEM71, and, most recently, Port Of 
Helsingborg72. 
 
B. RELEVANT CASE LAW 
 
 
1. EARLY CASES: SETTING THE MILESTONES OF EXCESSIVE PRICING 
 
In General Motors the Court of Justice, the court was confronted with the question of 
whether the prices charged by GM for vehicles conformity inspections of its European Models 
were unfair, considering that they corresponded to those charged for the much more costly 
inspections conducted for the American models. On that occasion the court, while annulling a 
Commission decision finding abusive monopoly pricing, gave its first hint for discerning what an 
"excessive price" might be: it recognized that, in principle, an abuse could include “the 
imposition of a price which is excessive in relation to the economic value of the service 
provided”. This sentence was then picked up and circumstantiated further in United Brands, 
where the Court gave its famous dicta that charging a high price would constitute an abuse if 
“[the price] has no reasonable relation to the economic value of the product supplied73.” 
The Court also ventured to say that this excess could, inter alia, be determined 
objectively if it were possible for it to be calculated by making a comparison between the selling 
price of the product in question and its cost of production, which would disclose the amount of 
                                                
67 See Art. 3.2, COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty . 
68 Case 26/75 General Motors v Commission [1975] ECR 136. 
69 United Brands v Commission of the European Communities [1978] ECR 207 appeal on Commission decision OJ 
[1976] L95/1. 
70 Case 226/84 British Leyland Public Limited Company v Commission, ECR (1986) 3263. 
71 Cases 110/88, 241/88 and 242/88, Lucazeau and others v. SACEM and others, 110/88 [1989] ECR- 2811 at §25. 
72 Case COMP/A.36.568/D3, Scandlines Sverige AB v Port of Helsingborg, Commission Decision of July 23, 2004 
(“Port of Helsingborg”), Para. 102. See also Case COMP/A.36.568/D3, Sundbusserne v Port of Helsingborg, 
Commission Decision of July 23, 2004, Para. 85. 
73 Case 27/76, United Brands Company v Commission [1978] ECR 207, Para. 250. 
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the profit margin. This, however, was indicated as only one possible way to determine the 
reasonableness of a price, by no means intended to be exhaustive. Therefore, it concluded 
crafting a two-pronged test applicable to any possible scenario to establish an excessive pricing 
abuse: "The questions therefore to be determined are whether the difference between the costs 
actually incurred and the price actually charged is excessive, and, if the answer to this question 
is in the affirmative, whether a price has been imposed which is either unfair in itself or when 
compared to competing products."74 
In the aftermath of United Brands, commentators split on the issue of whether the two 
limbs of the test were to be considered alternative or cumulative.  An influential stream of 
scholarship75 supported the former view, maintaining that the direct cost calculation (i.e. the first 
limb of the test) should enjoy priority. They referred to various decisions, including in particular 
one of the Court of Justice concerning the royalties charged by the Societè des Auteurs, 
Compositeurs at Editeurs de Musìque ("SACEM", a copyright collecting society),  where the 
Court admitted that "a price-cost comparison would be impossible, given the nature of the 
product -the creation and protection of a musical piece”76. This seemed indeed just a natural 
consequence of the fact that innovation is essentially a risky and uncertain process, and the 
definition of a "normal" ratio between investment and innovation cannot be given ex ante. But 
they also found some support in the judgment of the ECJ in Bodson77, where the comparative 
market test was relied upon in isolation as a possible method to determine whether a price was 
excessive78.  
Nevertheless, despite the apparently convincing nature of the evidence presented above, 
the prevailing scholarship has supported the opposite view that the test should be two-fold79. 
Their standard argument, which implies that a mere calculation of price-cost margins cannot be 
satisfactory , is that that such calculation is a meaningless exercise for the purposes of Article 
82(a), unless:  
 it is assumed that any price exceeding cost be abusive; or 
 there is a ‘workable’ competitive benchmark80.  
This view is now confirmed by the Commission decision in Port of Helsingborg, which settled 
the debate in favour of a cumulative test81 .  
                                                
74 United Brands, supra note 73, Para. 252.   
75 See for example E PIJNACKER HORDIJK, ‘Excessive Pricing Under EC Competition Law: An Update in the 
Light of ‘Dutch Developments’’,  in B. HAWK (Ed.), Fordham International Antitrust Law and Policy, New York, 
2002, 469. 
76 M. GAL, 'Monopoly Pricing as an Antitrust Offence in the U.S. and the EC: Two System of Belief About 
Monopoly?', (2004) 49 Antitrust Bulletin, 33.   
77 Case 30/87, Corinne Bodson v SA Pompes funèbres des régions libérées [1988] ECR 2507 .   
78 See E PIJNACKER HORDIJK, supra note 75, 469.   
79 See, by way of example, C ESTEVA-MOSSO, S.RYAN, 'Article 82—Abuse of a Dominant Position', in J. 
FAULL, A. NIKPAY (Eds.),  The EC Law of Competition, Oxford, 1999, 192. 
80 See R. O' DONOUGHE, J. PADILLA, The Law and Economics of Art. 82, Oxford, 2006, 611. 
81 Case COMP/A.36.568/D3, Scandlines Sverige AB v Port of Helsingborg, Commission Decision of July 23, 2004, 
Paras. 147, 149. See also Case COMP/A.36.568/D3, Sundbusserne v Port of Helsingborg,  Para. 85.   
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But let's analyse more closely what the economic foundations were to support a finding 
against a pure (or prevalent) price-cost comparison approach. Essentially, this approach is 
equivalent to the “Cost Plus” method that we have seen in the context of transfer pricing. Both 
can be exposed, therefore, to the following criticism. 
The most crucial issue is, as pointed above, that there is no predetermined appropriate 
measure of costs against which the actual costs are to be benchmarked. Even admitting that, 
according to conventional economic theory, prices should be equal to marginal costs of 
production, there is no commonly agreed method to define what factors determine how 
production costs should be allocated, both over time and across different product lines. 
Some economists have advocated the use of a proxy, precisely to avoid the intricacies and 
complications associated with a product-by-product cost allocation exercise: the long-run 
average incremental cost (hereinafter, L.R.A.I.C.) calculated from total value of the costs that are 
needed to enter a market and begin supplying a product, as an average over total output82. The 
facilitation of this proxy is that under L.R.A.I.C., the computation of common costs is excluded: 
only the costs that are causally related to the activity at issue are taken into account. The 
L.R.A.I.C. is thus equal to the long-run average avoidable cost of production (hereinafter, 
L.R.A.A.C.)83, plus the sunk costs incurred upon entry.  
As there is no consensus on what is the most appropriate reference between a precise 
computation of all costs and the use of the aforementioned proxy, this appears as an 
insurmountable obstacle for the use of price-cost comparison as a sole criterion to define 
excessiveness. Like the Court of Justice recognised in United Brands, "there may at times be 
very great difficulties in working out production costs which may sometimes include a 
discretionary apportionment of indirect costs and general expenditure and which may vary 
significantly according to the size of the undertaking, its object, the complex nature of its set up, 
its territorial area of operations, whether it manufactures one or several products, the number of 
its subsidiaries and their relationship with each other.” 84 
In fact, there is at least some consensus to the view that the pricing policy of a multi-
product firm should be analysed in its entirety and not in a piecemeal fashion, product by 
product. Unfortunately, however, the consensus regarding this issue is not unanimous: recent 
evidence for that is the fact that the “portfolio pricing” argument was ultimately rejected by the 
United Kingdom Competition Appeals Tribunal (hereinafter, C.A.T.) in its famous Napp 
decision85. 
The fact that there seems to be a prevailing view amongst different economic theories is 
                                                
82  See R. O' DONOUGHE, J. PADILLA, supra note 80, 614. 
83  As explained by O’Donoughe and Padilla, supra note 80, 615: "The LRA.A.C. is the total value of costs that are 
avoided in the long run if a company stops supplying a particular product, as an average over total company output. 
If L.R.A.A.C. exceeds current market prices, it would be cheaper and more rational for a firm to shut down the 
relevant product line than to continue in business".  
84 Case 27/76, United Brands Company v Commission [1978] ECR 207, Para. 254.   
85 Case CA98/2/2001, Napp Pharmaceuticals Holdings Ltd and Subsidiaries, Decision of Director General of Fair 
Trading on March 30, 2001 (“Napp”), on appeal Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Limited and Subsidiaries v 
Director General of Fair Trading [2002] CompAR 13.   
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not sufficient, in itself, to make of it a sound basis for policy-making on such a sensitive issue as 
pricing regulation, which touches upon the central nerve of a free-market economy. Arguably, an 
economic theory must yield a sufficient, almost incontestable recognition in the field before it 
can be a erected as a blueprint for how the law should stand. 
A second significant obstacle to the implementation of a price-cost criterion lies in the 
process of constructing a reasonable final price from the (already far less than crystal-clear) cost 
figures: any definition of what constitutes a reasonable profit margin must take into account a 
whole range of factors, including, e.g., economies of scale, sunk costs, and risk.  
This is an aspect directly related to the issue of the appropriate measure of costs 
introduced above, and will therefore not be further investigated in this context. Suffices to bear 
in mind that even where an appropriate measure of costs could be identified, a second part of the 
test would have to be satisfied by looking at whether the margin between prices and cost is 
unreasonable. As mentioned above and further discussed in the following section of this paper, 
some solution to this problem has been attempted in proposing the optimal rule for predatory 
pricing, by recurring to the use of L.R.A.I.C. as a proxy and relying on a presumption of legality 
as a complement to it.  One may wonder, then, why has this type of solution not been applied to 
the realm of excessive pricing, which poses the same problem of avoiding "undue" interference 
with the mechanism of prices. 
 
2. TOWARDS A GREATER RELIANCE ON “COMPARABLES”: THE “BRITISH LEYLAND” AND “SACEM” 
DECISIONS 
 
Another important decision case was British Leyland, where the Commission for the first 
time engaged in comparative market testing: given that the market where the abusive pricing had 
allegedly occurred was that for left-hand driven cars, and that vendors did not have to incur for 
their sale on that market any meaningful additional cost than in the market of right-hand driven 
cars, the latter market served as a useful parameter of comparison. The Commission also looked 
at the evolution of prices over time, thus making also an inter-temporal comparison, and spotted 
a sharp rise denoting a discriminatory intent on the pricing policy of the car sellers. As a result, 
the Court of the market investigation, the Commission found it unreasonable that importers of 
left-hand-driven cars had to pay six times the amount paid by right-hand-driven cars, and 
characterized this as an excessive pricing abuse.  
After few years, the concept of comparative market testing was expanded to include the 
use of geographic market comparison: in SACEM, the Court was asked to deliver a preliminary 
ruling on whether the fact that a French Copyright collecting society was charging more for 
licenses of performing rights than were similar collecting societies located in other Member 
States might constitute an abuse of dominant position under article 82 of the Treaty. The Court 
answered in the affirmative, explaining that: “When an undertaking holding a dominant position 
imposes scales of fees for its services which are appreciably higher than those charged in other 
member states and where a comparison of the fee levels has been made on a consistent basis, 
that difference must be regarded as indicative of an abuse of dominant position (Emphasis 
added). In such a case it is for the undertaking in question to justify the difference in reference to 
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objective dissimilarities between the situation in the member state concerned and the situation 
prevailing in all the other member states.” 86  
It is important to note that this ruling places great emphasis on the role of comparatives: 
where the dominant firm is found to be charging a rate that is substantially higher than that 
charged in comparable firms acting in comparable markets, it will be upon her the burden to 
demonstrate that this is justified by legitimate reasons. This seems to reverse the order of the 
conditions laid down in the United Brands ruling, which is why some commentators invoked this 
judgments in support of their reading of the alternative nature of such conditions.  
After a closer look, however, one can infer that the Court simply created a second and 
different rule with regard to excessive prices, perhaps to ease the task of the Commission were 
this convinced to prosecute such prices as an abuse, it could either: 
 benchmark price-cost margins, in which case it would then have to look also for a 
confirmation through valid comparators; or, 
 find a valid comparator, in which case it would then be upon the dominant firm to 
bring up cost-price margins and other relevant factors to justify the divergence vis 
à vis its comparator(s). 
Another interesting aspect of the judgment is that the Court established that, were the 
Competition authority to follow this alternative and facilitated method to determine "excessive 
prices", it would be irrelevant whether the dominant firm has just covered its or extracted just a 
reasonable profit out of the capital invested. Differently from what could be gathered from 
previous case-law, indeed,  low profits are not evidence of permitted behavior as much as high 
price-cost margin are not decisive evidence of abusive behavior: the crucial determination is 
whether  the actual price in the market is higher than that charged by the comparators. 
3. ONE STEP FURTHER – OR, PERHAPS, BACK? PORT OF HELSINGBORG AND THE ENHANCED 
IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
The most recent and in a sense revolutionary judgement on excessive pricing was probably 
delivered in the Port of Helsingborg case, dealing with a port fee for ferry operators that was 
alleged to be excessively high. The Commission here, after clarifying that the United Brands test 
is necessarily two-pronged and thus that a price-cost evaluation would have to be followed by a 
look for comparables, undertook a rigorous analysis of all the distinctive features of the port 
market and eventually found out that the characteristics of such market were so peculiar that it 
was not possible for it to find any valid comparator. In order to reach that finding, and as a 
consequence reject the complainant's allegations, the Commission the notion of "economic 
value"  and it aligned it more closely aligned with basic economic principles,  recognizing that 
“the economic value of the product/service cannot simply be determined by adding to the 
approximate costs incurred in the provision of this product/service…a profit margin which 
would be a pre-determined percentage of the product costs. [Rather, the] economic value must 
be determined with regards to the particular circumstances of the case and take into account 
                                                
86 Cases 110/88, 241/88 and 242/88, Lucazeau and others v. SACEM and others, 110/88 [1989] ECR- 2811 at Para. 
25. 
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also non-cost factors such as the demand for the product/service.” 87 
This part of the decision was particularly welcomed by leading economists like Padilla 
and Donoughe88, precisely because it finally places on the demand side the consideration it 
deserves. But other points of the decision were quite illuminating as well, contributing to a 
clarification of the concepts of “costs” and “reasonable margins” used in the decision practice 
and at the number of factors that are considered when defining their magnitude. These 
clarifications are: 
 the need to recoup investments (such as high sunk costs) and the intangible value 
of the good should be included in an assessment of the “economic value.” This 
was reflected by the regard had for the particular nature of the port due to its 
ability of being tailored to customer's needs within that area, and the additional 
value that it would gain for that simple reason, even though that value was not 
reflected in its annual accounts89.  
 the need to take into account also any opportunity-cost for that good90, i.e. any 
loss from potential uses to which the assets in question could be assigned.  
Perhaps an economist could argue, to simplify, that these clarifications are nothing but a 
specification of the enhanced consideration for demand-side contingencies, in the first  case, and 
a necessary adaptation to the “more economic approach” developed by the Commission, as to 
the second. 
For non-economists, however, the novelty and the scope of these clarifications are 
probably much more striking and important, for they make excessive pricing cases even more 
complex than they used to be, and extremely difficult to win for plaintiffs.  
 
C. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS VS. “BRIGHT-LINE” RULES: WHAT’S THE BEST WAY 
FORWARD? 
 
While the case-law has demonstrated appreciating the difficulties and dangers associated 
with the crucial tasks of overseeing prices, they seem to have come to a closer alignment with 
economic theories, abandoning the formalism that originally characterized excessive pricing 
cases and embracing that "more economic approach" that is now pervading the enforcement of 
competition law as a whole.  
Nevertheless, the courts have not eliminated the reference to certain formal yardsticks, such as 
the use of geographical and inter-temporal comparison, amongst others, which have maintained a 
residual role of guidance in the competitive assessment conducted by the competition authorities. 
But was the departure from such formal, bright-line rules desirable? What seems remarkable is 
                                                
87 Port of Helsingborg, Para. 227. 
88 See R.O’ DONOUGHE, J. PADILLA, supra note 80,  612. 
89 Port of Helsingborg, Para. 209. 
90 Ibid. 
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that while in British Leyland the court had basically established a shortcut to make the rules on 
excessive pricing more amenable both to enforcement and predictability by the dominant firm, in 
Port of Helsingborg the shortcut was undone by bringing in punctilious economic meaning to the 
term "comparator" which makes it, concretely, very difficult for it to be found.  One may then 
validly raise the argument that, given the great importance of the reference to comparators and 
particularly of the predictability thereof, the Court should have restrained the extent and depth of 
economic analysis to be used in excessive pricing cases. 
A couple of more specific questions can be added to the aforementioned one: do the 
magnitude and frequency of the error costs justify such departure from formalistic decision-
making? And if so, are these costs so high as to warrant reverting to in depth economic analysis? 
As stressed above, the case-law has been unclear in this regard, swinging back and forth from 
full reliance on economic analysis. Some valuable indications to trace the lost way, then, may be 
found in the rules applied in the context of predatory pricing. 
 
III. SECTION 3: PREDATORY PRICING 
 
A. PREDATORY PRICING: TRADITIONAL VS. MODERN DEFINITIONS 
 
A predatory price is a price that is profit-maximizing only because of its exclusionary or 
other anticompetitive effects, i.e., a price implying the sacrifice of profits in the short run in order 
to eliminate competition and get higher profits in the long run. 
As recently explained in a working paper on the economic theory of predation91, this is 
only the modern definition of predation, which is much more general than the one traditionally 
employed by antitrust economics until the rise of the “Chicago revolution” ” of antitrust law. 
Even though the legal definition of predation as such has not been amended in response to the 
Chicago critique, Chicago scholars had in fact a significant indirect impact on the design of the 
modern rule. More explicitly, their meditations opened the door to the consideration in predatory 
pricing cases of a variety of theories and speculations that was previously not necessary to 
address, essentially because the conceptual framework underlying predation was much more 
simple and uncontroversial. The insurgence of these theories thus  increasingly complicated the 
courts' task to take in due time a final decision  which accounts for all the equities on both the 
plaintiff's and the defendant's side, owing to the greater risk of falling into one of those “ type I 
errors” (i.e., false positives) that are jointly feared by the Chicagoans and their counterparts92. 
                                                
91 See N. GIOCOLI, When Low is no Good: Predatory Pricing and the History of Antitrust Economics (Part I) , 
2009, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1412808, giving a complete and extensive overview of the 
evolution of the legal standard for predatory pricing in the US. 
92 As clearly put by a recent piece of scholarship on the influence of the Chicago School on antitrust law, “The 
Harvard School’s sensitivity to the possibility of deterring pro-competitive conduct as a result of judicial error is 
largely related to the Chicago School’s error cost framework. The powerful intellectual foundations of the error-
cost framework, grounded in  basic decision theory and accepted by Chicago, Harvard, and most economists, is one 
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This prompted courts to seek new ad hoc rules precisely to avoid all the intricacies which going 
down the Chicago-route would imply. 
The more traditional definition of predation, according to which a dominant firm sells its 
products below cost in order to eliminate rivals and subsequently earn a monopoly profit, was  
focused on the two key elements of market power and intent, meaning by the latter the intention 
to exploit a price reduction in order to increase or consolidate that power.  Since a rigorous 
reading of such a combination would make it extremely difficult to bring a successful case of 
predatory pricing, the American courts 93 relaxed the requisites essentially alleviating plaintiffs 
from the need to substantiate a proof of the existence of either one of these requisites with 
sufficient precision: all a plaintiff needed to show was a convincing story from which the court 
could infer the existence of dominance and of the intent to exclude competitors through 
predation. The most frequently told story, and one which the courts seemed satisfied with, was 
that of “long pursue” or “deep pockets”, according to which the predator could take advantage of 
superior financial resources (usually deriving from the presence in multiple markets) to remain 
on business while driving the prey out of the market.  
With regard to intent, instead, which in theory would require proving that there is no 
rational explanation to justify the company's behaviour other than excluding competitors out of 
the market, the courts began to infer its existence from the likelihood of verification of the 
effects, i.e. of a successful predation. And due to the “structure-conduct-performance” paradigm 
that dominated antitrust economics from the 1930s to the 1970s, this information was normally 
inferred from the structural data itself, i.e. the existence of market power. Essentially, then, the 
standard applied to predatory pricing resulted as one of a  "per se" rule: if a company was found 
to have sufficient market power and to fall within one of the stories considered plausible to 
support a predatory pricing allegation, it would have no way to escape liability. 
 
B. THE FIRST ATTACK TO THE TRADITIONAL MODEL AND THE PROPOSED 
ALTERNATIVES 
 
The breakthrough occurred when the “Chicago-boy” Mc Gee first pointed at the fact that 
the theory that was normally relied upon by the courts was in fact a flawed one94. In line with the 
school's emphasis on efficiencies and with the assumption of functioning markets, Mc Gee 
suggested that predating is never rational (i.e. profitable) since there are always more profitable 
                                                                                                                                                       
reason why the framework has become a building block for modern competition policy”. See  J. D. WRIGHT, 
'Overshot the Mark? A Simple Explanation of the Chicago School's Influence on Antitrust', (2009) Competition 
Policy International, Forthcoming, 16; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 09-23. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1370641. 
93 This historic part of the analysis of predatory prices is by nature focused on US antitrust law, as no European 
counterpart existed until the creation of the European Community in 1957. 
94 J.S. MC GEE, 'Predatory Price Cutting: the Standard Oil (N.J.) Case', (1958) 1 Journal of Law and Economics, 
169. 
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strategies available to the firm95; and that as a result, predatory attempt should be considered at 
best very rare. And even then, there is a list of possible countermeasures that could be deployed 
to prevent the occurrence of predation, such as the possibility for customers to stock up during 
the low-price period, or for the prey to offer long-term contracts to its customers warranting them 
the provision of the good at the competitive price or for financial investors to back the prey’s 
resistance96 . 
The essential recommendation by McGee concerning the legal standard, then, was that 
the plaintiff's burden could not be satisfied simply by arguing a plausible “deep pocket” story, 
rather it was necessary for it to show with convincing evidence that the market was affected by 
serious barriers to entry able to impede the necessary competitive readjustments which would 
otherwise occur once the price-rising period begins.   
After McGee's contribution, there have been substantially no predatory pricing cases in 
which the US Supreme Court has taken the opportunity to formulate a new legal standard 
supporting this more economic, price-theory-driven approach.  What is perhaps more 
remarkable, in the only case that reached the Supreme Court before the mid-Eighties97 the Court 
rejected all the claims that focused on the importance of structural barriers -which was in itself 
the most important element of the test proposed by McGee. The discussion continued, however, 
in the economic literature: in reaction to McGee, other Chicago scholars came out some years 
later offering alternative stories upon which predation's rationality could be based , such as the 
"reputation" story (meaning that a firm may want to establish a reputation of strong predator in 
one market to show that it is generally hostile to entries in any other market), the "threat" story 
(meaning that predation is used as a signal to the new entrant that market conditions are 
unfavourable) and the "error of evaluation" story (meaning that a firm may overestimate its 
capacity to accomplish predation). Overall, the common theme of the Chicagoans was to point to 
the central role played by strategic considerations in the decision of engaging in predation. As 
remarked by Posner: “Eliminate strategic considerations and it becomes impossible to construct 
a rational motivation for predatory pricing without assuming (very uncongenially to a 
Chicagoan) asymmetric access to the capital markets for financing a period of below-cost 
selling. But to ignore strategic considerations is not satisfactory.”98 
A natural reaction to this enhanced confusion on the economic theory regarding predation  
would have been, logically, that of transforming the sort of "per se" illegality standard  into a 
"rule of reason" analysis, meaning to a full evaluation of the circumstances of the case to see 
whether any particular theory of harm is warranted in the particular case. The courts, however, 
did not demonstrate being enthusiastic about going down this route: probably disturbed by the 
                                                
95 The key argument was independent from the idea that supra-competitive margins would be swept away by new 
entrants: he observed that since predation involves unnecessary and avoidable losses of profit, and the magnitude of 
these losses is normally higher for the predator than for the prey, the firm will always have more profitable strategies 
at its disposal (such as direct acquisition of the prey for example). 
96 The remark was based on the consideration that if a firm is efficient, there is no reason why it should find no 
assistance from capital markets. 
97 Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 18 L.Ed.2d 406; 87 S.Ct. 1326; 386 U.S. 685 (1967). 
98 R.A. POSNER, 'The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis', (1979) 127 U. PA. L. Rev., 939. 
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contradictions of economic theories, that were being exasperated by the fact that some 
disagreements existed even within the Chicago school, they were unwilling to dip into the much 
more sophisticated economic analysis that an embracement of the strategic considerations 
approach would require. 
On the contrary, the Supreme Court found itself much more comfortable with a bright-
line rule, devised by the two famous Harvard scholars Philippe Areeda and Donald Turner99. The 
two scholars proposed a test based exclusively on costs, upon which the courts should draw their 
inference of legality. The test was grounded on the basic economic theory that under competitive 
conditions, firms set their price equal to marginal costs (hereinafter, M.C.), i.e. the increase in 
total expenditure resulting from a small rise in output of the relevant product100. As pricing 
below marginal cost entails a sacrifice of profits, this economic theory suggested that any price 
below reasonably-anticipated, short-run marginal costs ought to be illegal. But as marginal costs 
do not generally result from a firm's accounts, and are difficult to identify (especially because of 
the different practices of costs allocation, and the vagueness of the notion of “reasonably 
anticipated” costs), the test proposed the use of Average Variable Costs  (i.e., the sum of average 
fixed costs and the sum of average variable costs: hereinafter, A.V.C.) as a proxy to determine 
the illegality of below- cost selling.  
While the test finally offered a clear benchmark for the judicial assessment of predatory 
practices, it was obviously not immune from critics by a variety of economists and legal 
scholars. More precisely, these critics took issue with two aspects of the test. First of all, as 
anticipated above, the neglecting of strategic considerations: this was the biggest critique coming 
from a rich strand of literature that had its origin in the aftermath of McGee's article, but that had 
gone reinvigorating throughout the years and was at its peak when the famous Areeda-Turner 
publication came out.  
The second critique was on the use of A.V.C. as a threshold. In particular, the main 
objection was that A.V.C. may differ from M.C., and may be significantly lower, which would 
imply that the rule would let unpunished some prices that fall in fact much below marginal costs.  
Following this criticism, some commentators have proposed to base the test on Average 
Avoidable Costs (hereinafter, A.A.C.), instead, i.e. to calculate the difference between the 
incremental cost of remaining in the market and the avoidable cost that the firm's exit would 
imply and aim to punish the pricing conduct when this difference is positive101 . This would have 
the advantage of not separating variable and fixed costs, taking into account also the latter 
element in the computation of the appropriate cost-based comparator. But it is still imperfect, for 
                                                
99 P. AREEDA, D.F. TURNER, 'Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act', 
(1975) 88  Harvard L. Rev., 697. 
100  Note that this theory, although widely accepted and adopted by standard textbooks, is not immune from critics: 
see R.PITTMAN, Who Are You Calling Irrational? Marginal Costs, Variable Costs, and the Pricing Practices of 
Firms, Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper 09/03, US Antitrust Division, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/eag/discussion_papers.htm. 
101 See W.J. BAUMOL, 'Predation and the Logic of the Average Variable Cost Test',  (1996) 39 Journal of Law & 
Economics, 49 and OECD, Predatory Foreclosure (2005) DAF/COMP 14,  23. See also P BOLTON, J.F. 
BRODLEY, M.H. RIORDAN, 'Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy' , (2000) 88 Georgetown L.  J., 
2239, who advocate use of the average avoidable cost test in place of the A.V.C. test. 
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it suffers from the many complications arising out of the fact that some assets can be redeployed 
between different businesses, that there may be a revenue spill-over effect associated with some 
sales and that one cannot establish with certainty the measure of costs associated with an event 
that has not occurred102. 
Another proposal has been to rely on L.R.A.I.C., meaning the firm's total production 
costs (including the product), less what the firm's total cost would have been had it not produced 
the product, divided by the quantity of the product produced103.   While this test would also avoid 
the complication of cataloguing costs as fixed or variable and allocating common costs, it cannot 
discern the situation of firms with high fixed costs that need to price at a relatively low price to 
“penetrate” the market. Therefore, proponents of this test argue that prices below L.R.A.I.C. are 
not in themselves sufficient to prove predation, and should be accompanied by circumstantial 
elements proving intent to exclude an equally or more efficient competitor.  
There is a reputable stream of scholarship, however, warning against the use of an 
“intent” requirement for predation cases. Such scholarship finds perhaps its most illustrative 
representation in the following excerpt of an opinion delivered by Richard Posner as Appellate 
Judge for the 7th Circuit104: “the importance of intent in tort and criminal law does not 
automatically translate in antitrust law for the obvious reason that when an individual kills, 
steals from or causes a loss to another, the society as a whole undoubtedly suffers, but the 
opposite is true when a firm “kills” its rival by “stealing” all its customers thanks to lower 
prices or superior products: in such a case the society as a whole is better off because this is 
what is supposed to happen in competitive markets!” 
In sum, the proposal by Areeda and Turner was followed by a lively discussion, not only 
on the appropriate notion of costs but also, more generally, on the cutting short of strategic 
considerations, which had in fact been showed by the literature to be an important justification 
for the rationality of predatory pricing.105 
 
C. THE LESS THAN FULL JUDICIAL ENDORSEMENT OF THE “AREEDA – TURNER” TEST: 
US VS. EU 
 
The result of this fight between economists has been, quite obviously, the failure of a full 
endorsement of the Areeda- Turner test. It is important, however, to note the different twist that 
such development has taken in the EU and the US.  
                                                
102 See O’DONOUGHE, PADILLA, supra note 80, 243. 
103 See P. BOLTON, J.F. BRODLEY, M.H. RIORDAN, supra note 101, 2272. 
104 In a 1986 7th Circuit decision, quoted by W.K. TOM, 'Game Theory in the Everyday Life of the Antitrust 
Practitioner', (1997) 5 George Mason L. Rev., 464: see Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 797 
F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir. 1986). 
105 J.F. BRODLEY, G.A. HAY,  'Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories and the Evolution of 
Legal Standards',  (1981) 66 Cornell L. Rev., 738. 
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In the EU, antitrust legislation had been in force since almost 30 years when the ECJ 
came down with its leading decision on predatory pricing. In AKZO106, the ECJ relied on the 
Areeda- Turner test as a point of reference. However, it did not want to rule out the possibility 
that a firm may be engaged in predatory conduct even if its prices are above total costs. On the 
contrary, it explicitly recognized that the rule would be under-inclusive, and admitted that 
strategic considerations might play a role in the predator's plan.  
Even admitting the importance of strategic considerations, though, the Court drew an 
important distinction with regard to a specific category, that is, selling below A.V.C.: in that 
particular case, the exclusionary consequences are so self - evident that no evidence of intention 
to eliminate a competitor is required. Accordingly, the decision proceeds setting a different 
standard for prices below average total costs (that is to say, fixed costs plus variable costs), but 
above average variable costs: these must be regarded as abusive only if they are determined as 
part of a plan for eliminating a competitor. Despite the soundness of such categorization of 
prices, one may question whether strategic considerations should be brought in as an additional 
element not only to infer the existence of predation, but also to evoke a legitimate defence.  
Those elements, in fact, are implicitly downplayed by the AKZO test as they are confined 
to a later stage, where the court assesses whether the defendant's claims falls under one of the 
possible justifications for an apparently predatory behaviour. This, as will be explained below, is 
a consequence of the nature of the presumption, which is not a definite one ("iuris et de iure") 
but rather just an inference ("iuris tantum") that can be subject  to rebuttal by the defendant. 
Admittedly, these elements still play an important role in the dominant firm's decision-
making, enabling it to pursue secure strategies upon a reading of a relatively well-established 
case-law. Yet even a quick review of these justifications indicates that their consideration is not 
quite a fully-fetched balancing of economic arguments, for this would impair the ability to 
deliver an expedite and consistent decision-making, this time by the courts and competition 
authorities. A good example is the so called "meeting competition" defense that has been raised 
and admitted, at least in principle, in a series of cases (including AKZO, Hilti107, Tetra Pack II108 
, BPB Industries 109, British Sugar/Napier Brown110
 
Irish Sugar111, Digital112
 
and Wanadoo113) 
                                                
106 Case C -6 2/86 Akzo Chemie BV v. Commission [1991] ECR 1-3359. 
107 Eurofix-Bauco v Hilti, OJ 1988 L 65/19. Hilti was obliged to cease all price discrimination by ensuring that any 
differences in its prices were justified by differences in costs, except where it was necessary to meet a competitive 
offer, in making promotions, or where to do so would generate sales that Hilti would not otherwise make.   
108 Tetra Pak II, OJ 1992 L 72/1, Para. 148 (argument that Tetra Pak was merely meeting competition recognized 
but rejected on factual grounds).   
109 See BPB Industries plc, OJ 1989 L 10/50, Para. 133, where the Commission accepted BPB’s “Super Schedule A” 
prices because they were neither predatory nor part of any scheme of systematic alignment.   
110 See Napier Brown/British Sugar, OJ 1988 L 284/41, Para. 31, where the Commission suggested that while 
undercutting a competitor’s prices would be abusive, matching them would not.   
111 See Irish Sugar plc, OJ 1997 L 258/1, Para 134 (“[T]here is no doubt that a firm in a dominant position is 
entitled to defend that position by competing with other firms on its market.”).  
112 In this case the Commission recognised that dominant companies must be allowed to offer prices reductions 
(called “Allowances”) in individual cases “to meet comparable service offerings of a competitor. No Allowance shall 
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but surprisingly (or perhaps wisely, considering the complex calculation it may involve) rejected 
in its Guidance paper on enforcement priorities114 with regard to prices below L.R.A.I.C. (since 
the Commission will limit its inquiry to what is necessary for the application of the "as efficient 
competitor test"115. Similarly, the possibility of purportedly incurring in start-up losses for 
penetration purposes finds a recognized but limited role, since the Commission has made clear in 
Wanadoo that it will strongly rely on extensive circumstantial evidence of exclusionary intent 
such as internal documents, probability of recoupment and actual or likely exclusionary effects 
(instead of entertaining the question of whether it can be reasonably anticipated that future 
profits will compensate the start-up losses). 
It appears, therefore, that the role of economic analysis at the justification stage is 
restrained by the imposition of limits to the speculations that the defendant may require the 
courts to make. Nonetheless, the very existence of the possibility to rebut a purely cost-based 
analysis with a (limited) variety of economic arguments (i.e., the efficiencies identified in 
Section III D of the Guidance Paper) is to be appreciated, as it prevents the realization of the 
"worst-case" scenario of automatic application of the prohibition to conducts that may in itself be 
pro-competitive. 
In the US, where the concern for type I errors has been historically greater, the leading 
decision on predatory pricing demonstrated even more openness to the defendant's arguments, 
establishing that to bring about a predatory pricing claim a plaintiff has to show:  
 price in appropriate measure under the average variable rivals’ cost; 
 reasonable prospect of recouping investment116.  
The most important nuance from previous case-law was that the Court introduced a 
requisite (prospect of recoupment) that detaches from the subjective notion of intent, marking an 
important steps towards a complete objectivization of the standard. Such test gives more leeway 
to the defendant's argument in the first place, by setting a very high evidentiary threshold (which 
has resulted, in fact, in no successful predation case since the decision has been rendered up until 
at least 1998117).  
                                                                                                                                                       
be offered until Digital has completed an internal review process designed to verify that the proposed Allowance is 
offered in good faith as a proportional response to real or (based upon information from the customer or other 
reliable sources) reasonably anticipated competitive offerings and will not result in a foreclosure or distortion of 
competition for the servicing of Digital Systems in any Member State.” 
113 See Case COMP/38.233, Wanadoo Interactive, Commission Decision of July 16, 2003, OJ C 262, 23.10.2004, 
53, Para. 316.   
114 Communication from the Commission C(2009) 864, Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in 
applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings (hereinafter, 
"Guidance Paper") 
115  Which takes into account as legitimate defenses only the role of efficiencies, and provided they fulfill the 
conditions for objective justifications  set out in Section III D of the Guidance Paper. See  ibid., at. 67. 
116 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 220 (1993). 
117  See A. EDLIN, 'Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing', (2002) 111Yale L..J., 941 (“Since 1993, when the 
Supreme Court decided Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., no predatory pricing plaintiff 
has prevailed in a final determination in the federal courts.”). While one scholar stated that there have been more 
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More provocatively, one could argue that under the American rules the defendant's 
arguments of prospective efficiency, meeting competition, launch of promotional offers and so 
forth are already accounted for "by default"  through the incorporation of the recoupment 
requisite. And while one may argue that its existence is a consequence of the different approach 
of anti-monopoly law in the US - where a firm can be accused of monopolization or attempt to 
monopolize even in the absence of the structural element of market dominance, which is, in turn, 
a prerequisite for Art. 82 claims under EC competition law - this fails to recognize that there is a 
subtle difference between the ex ante dominance required in EC law and the ex post 
dominance118 (or oligopolistic concentration, as established by the Brooke Group decision) that 
would be necessary to infer  a reasonable prospect of recoupment under the US rule. Even 
though it seems reasonably correct to assume that if a firm is capable of behaving “to an 
appreciable extent  independently from its competitors"119 it will not lack the ability to raise 
prices without triggering further entries, this paradigm may not hold true in rapidly evolving 
markets, where barriers may not last long enough to allow the necessary recoupment, or where 
potential competitors whose business is still in its infancy might quickly grow to represent a 
competitive threat. 
 Secondly, another key novelty of the decision was the explicit admission, for the first 
time120, that a cost-based standard would drive assessments in predation cases. This, however, 
was the part of the test that made it more uncertain, since the Court did not pin down any specific 
reference of a reasonable "measure of costs" to be used as a benchmark Allegedly, such an open 
definition was designed to embark on the useful cost-based test recommended by Areeda and 
Turner, yet at the same time avoiding an ex ante condemnation of potential pro-competitive 
conduct.  Significative evidence to corroborate this argument is the fact that the Court refused to 
grant certi orari on two occasions when the question of determining the "appropriate measure of 
costs" was squarely presented121. 
                                                                                                                                                       
recent victories, the cases cited do not support the proposition that predatory pricing has been conclusively shown. 
In this sense, see D. A. CRANE, 'The Paradox of Predatory Pricing', (2005) 91Cornell L. Rev., 4.  
118 See Matushita Electric Industrial Co v Zenith Radio 475 U.S. 574 (1986), at 588-89:"For the investment to be 
rational, the [predator] must have a reasonable expectation of recovering, in the form of later monopoly profits, 
more than the losses suffered". 
119 Standard definition of dominance, used for the first time in Case 27/76 United Brands Company and United 
Brands Continental v Commission [1978] ECR 207, Para. 65, and picked up by the majority of Art. 82 decisions, as 
well as by the Guidance paper (Para. III, 10). 
120 Even though in previous decisions the Court referred to the use of cost-based method as a potential criteria, it 
had not established this as a necessary  for the competitive assessment. See Matushita Electric Industrial Co v 
Zenith Radio 475 U.S. 574 (1986) and Cargill Inc v Monfort of Colorado, Inc 479 U.S. 104 (1986). See also Utah 
Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 US 685 (1967), at 702-703: the Court held that each of the three defendants 
had violated the Robinson-Patman Act by selling below cost and engaging in other predatory behavior. However, it 
did not hold, nor even suggest, that below-cost pricing was critical to a violation. See ibid. (“It might be argued that 
the respondents' conduct displayed only fierce competitive instincts. Actual intent to injure another competitor does 
not, however, fall into that category, and neither, when viewed in the context of the Robinson - Patman Act, do 
persistent sales below cost and radical price cuts themselves discriminatory.”). 
121 See Rebeil Oil Co., INc. v Atl. Richfield Co., 146F.3d 1088 (9th Cir 1998), cert. denied , 25 US 1017 (1998); Int'l 
Travel Arrangers v. NWA, 991 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 US 932 (1993). 
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Overall, then, it seems that the Court decided to go very careful about regulating 
predation. This approach stems from the belief (reinforced by some of the above mentioned 
writings by the Chicago school)  that predation is uncommon, and therefore judicial mistakes 
that would condemn pro-competitive price-cutting are more dangerous than regulatory pitfalls 
which leave unpunished potentially anticompetitive conduct. Notably, the Court stressed that : 
“Mistaken inferences [in predation cases] are especially costly, because they chill the very 
conduct [vigorous price-competition] that antitrust laws are designed to protect”122.  
Naturally, because of such a one-sided resolution of the trade-off between type I and type 
II errors, the rule exposed itself to the criticism of being too permissive: it created, in fact, a “safe 
harbor” for above-cost selling which may leave some effective predation strategy unpunished123. 
The result is therefore an opposite one with respect to the "worse case-scenario" depicted above 
for the EU legislation, with the only (important) circumstantiation that such scenario has not 
materialized in that context, having the case-law recognized the existence of some possible 
"objective justifications". In the US, conversely, the Supreme Court has not admitted this 
exception, nor it has established whether any circumstantial evidence is apt to rebut the 
presumption of legality enjoyed by above-cost selling. 
Whether this is desirable depends, once again, on the importance attached to the values of 
administrability and predictability. Just as a rule of per se illegality may be justified on the basis 
of “economic prediction, judicial convenience and business certainty"124, so does a rule of per se 
legality. The ultimate question, however, is whether the danger of letting a potentially 
anticompetitive category of aggressive price-cutting (i.e., above-cost selling) unpunished is 
outweighed by the societal gain derived from saving the costs related to the identification, the 
enforcement and litigation of the practices that fall under such category. 
 
D. A MORE EQUITABLE AND ADMINISTRABLE TEST: TAKE-HOME LESSON? 
 
In the writers' perspective, the rule developed in the EU is preferable to that designed by 
the US Supreme Court on two grounds: first, that it defines a precise and predictable measure of 
costs. This allows a dominant firm to rationally decide its pricing policy, without incurring risk 
                                                
122 see Matushita v Zenith, 475 US 574, 591 (1986); at 594, quoted in Brooke Group, at 226. 
123 See J. B. KIRKWOOD, ‘Controlling Above-Cost Predation: An Alternative to Weyerhaeuser and Brooke 
Group’, (2009) Antitrust Bulletin; Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1027261;  P. 
BOLTON, J.F. BRODLEY, M.H. RIORDAN, 'Predatory Pricing: Response to Critique and Further Elaboration', 
(2001) 89 Georgetown L. J., 2516 at note 114. See also J.BAKER, 'Predatory Pricing after Brooke Group: An 
Economic Perspective', (1994) 62 Antitrust L.J., 591; J. P. GUILTINAN, G. T. GUNDLACH, 'Aggressive and 
Predatory Pricing: A Framework for Analysis', (1996) 60 J. Marketing, 94; L. A. SULLIVAN, W. S. GRIMES, The 
Law of Antitrust: An Integrated Handbook, II Edition, New York, 2006, 168. Finally, Professors Edlin and Elhauge 
concur: A. S. EDLIN, 'Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing', (2002) 111 Yale L. J., 944 and E. ELHAUGE, 'Why 
Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out Entrants Are Not Predatory – and the Implications for Defining Costs and 
Market Power', (2003) 112 Yale L. J., 686. 
124 See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 354 (1982). 
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of being disrupted in its operations by doubtful predation claims and having to rebut the alleged 
theories of harm by recurring to ad hoc economic experts' testimony. 
Second, it properly allocates the burden of proof by requiring the defendant- and not the 
plaintiff or the competition authority- to provide internal documents proving its costs and price-
related policies: these are elements that would otherwise be extremely difficult to prove, given 
the sensitiveness and confidentiality of the documents and the general reluctance of a company 
to give an accurate quote of its actual costs and internal policies. 
The presumptive nature of the rule, in fact, reaps the benefit of serving as a roadmap to 
hard and fast decision making, without at the same time being an obstacle to the introduction of a 
justification story on the part of the defendant. It does not preclude, thus, the use of more 
sophisticated economic theories, as long as they are tried and proved by the defendant.  
 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The way tax law and antitrust law deal with the intervention of the public authority into 
the most intimate dimension of a business, that is, its pricing policy are different in scope, depth 
and, quite obviously, purpose. 
First of all, transfer pricing is primarily concerned with cross-border situations, while 
excessive pricing and predatory pricing monitoring are  predominantly a domestic issue, even 
though their legal source may be grounded in supranational provisions, as it is the case with EU 
legislation on the subject. 
Secondly, transfer pricing is a system for monitoring physiological situations, as it is just 
logical that in a world were taxes can affect rates of return, M.N.E.s factor in also tax rates when 
defining their cross-border pricing policies. On the contrary, both excessive pricing and 
predatory pricing are pathological phenomena whose occurrence is by definition limited as not 
all the firms operating in a given market can afford to put such behaviors into practice. 
Thirdly, while transfer pricing can encompass some “win – win” situations for taxpayers 
and Tax Administrations alike, e.g., when a satisfactory A.P.A. is reached, the antitrust 
monitoring of company pricing is always a zero sum game: since the safeguard of the markets is 
a public policy issue per se, there is a very limited scope for bargaining between antitrust 
authorities and firms.  
At the same time, however, the way tax authorities and competition authorities deal with 
the monitoring of prices, costs and profit margins, which may be subject to manipulation by 
firms, inevitably share some features. 
The first resemblance is that the monitoring exercise, in both the areas of transfer pricing 
and excessive pricing/predatory pricing, is conceptually based on a benchmarking assessment. In 
the case of transfer pricing, the benchmark is represented by the arm’s length standard; in the 
case of predatory pricing and excessive pricing, such benchmark is to be found in the notions of  
A.V.C. and "valid comparator", respectively. 
In both cases, the foremost conceptual difficulty encountered by policy makers is how to 
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turn principles and standards which are often based on complex and abstract economic concepts 
into a workable diagnostic tool with which real actors such as firms (and not markets!) come into 
dealing. 
With respect to transfer pricing, an almost century long development in the United States 
and a decade long debate at the OECD level have led to a more consolidated platform of 
concrete applicable methodologies.  
Despite their conceptual and practical shortcomings, both transaction-based methods and 
profit-based methods developed within the context of transfer pricing are well experimented 
tools which can be applied with a satisfactory degree of consistency and predictability. In this 
respect, the very existence of a lively debate forum such as the OECD has contributed to an 
accurate weighing of the different methods and to the building of a consolidated theoretical and 
operational platform. 
On the contrary, the diagnostics of excessive pricing and predatory pricing has mostly 
developed through national or regional case law, often characterized by a limited deference to 
the principle of stare decisis, as it is often common in matters that undergo a rapid evolution and 
have yet to find their ubi consistam. 
In this respect, a preliminary observation confirms the importance of soft law and 
discussion forum on the shaping of sensitive economic law policy making in a world so 
globalised such as ours. Competition law, at least in the specific areas that are under the focus of 
this study, would then greatly benefit from the creation of ad hoc commissions composed of 
representatives from multinational enterprises, national administrations and scholars, in a way 
akin to the valuable experience of the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum.   
Take, for example, the problem of finding a comparable: determining whether a price or a 
profit level indicator is such to fall outside the scope of an arm’s length range or whether a 
pricing practice constitutes a form of excessive or predatory pricing implies, in any case, a 
comparative analysis between the transactions or the prices under scrutiny and a term of 
reference. On this particular issue, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines devote a whole 
section, discussing the variables that should be taken into account depending on the transfer 
pricing methodologies that have been adopted, as well as the adjustments to be applied in order 
to restore comparability125. 
On the contrary, the developments in the evaluation of “fair prices” for excessive pricing 
purposes have taken different and inconsistent paths throughout the case law, and lack a proper 
unitary coordination. This has led to a remarkable state of uncertainty for firms, which, for the 
time being, cannot confidently predict the terms of comparability against which they will be 
judged. 
Another crucial contact point shared between antitrust and international taxation is the 
challenging task of devising the appropriate legal test to identify "unfair prices". On that respect, 
we have seen in the preceding paragraphs how the three distinct price regulations have ended up 
approaching the concept of “fair” prices in a completely different fashion.  
Such a circumstance may seem even more striking considering that two of these 
                                                
125 Such a structured approach has been confirmed and brought forward by the 2009 version of the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines, where a whole chapter devoted to the procedural and timing issues of a comparability analysis 
have been introduced. 
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regulations pertain to the same area of law, and actually relate to the same article126.  But this 
internal inconsistency can be explained, at least in part, with an argument similar to that made 
above to remind the separate realms in which antitrust and taxation operate: such differentiation 
is required by the distinct object of inquiry that these two regulations are concerned with. While 
excessive pricing, in fact, requires to prove that the prices charged are beyond any rational 
expectation from the consumers' perspective, the prohibition against predatory pricing only 
applies if the rationality of the prospective predation is proven to the requisite legal standard.  
The analysis is thus remarkably different in its subjective scope, as the authority in the 
latter case it will be to a lesser extent able to draw inferences from the market, having instead to 
recur to the analysis of internal documents of the suspected predator to verify its pricing policy.  
This seems to justify a more limited role, in this context, for economic analysis: the fact that 
some information can be provided only by the defendant recommends, for administrative 
convenience and simplification purposes, to adopt a different settings, by which the intention to 
accomplish predation is presumed as long as circumstances in the market point in that 
direction127.  
Despite the persistent differences between the two fields, a valid argument can be made - 
as the present work purports to do - that some limits to the use of economic analysis must be 
imposed in the context of excessive pricing, too, precisely in order to avoid the costs and 
complexity that an adequate weighing of all relevant circumstances in that case may involve. 
This would be, after all, in line with the fact that the case-law on excessive pricing still relies to a 
great extent on the use of comparables as presumptions that facilitate the assessment.  
Yet, the use of such facilitators has not been streamlined in such a way that they can be 
considered as rebuttable presumptions; rather, they represent a legal hurdle that allows for the 
authority to conclusively qualify a price as excessive. Unfortunately, a clarification on whether a 
defendant would be entitled to raise any defense for some predetermined objective justifications 
(such as, for instance, the need to recoup start-up losses or the matching of prices charged by 
certain competitors) is yet to be made. 
To that extent, it seems that the type of structure used within predatory pricing may serve 
as a valid source of inspiration. But the test would have to be substantially different, so as to 
accommodate the different object of inquiry: the undertaking accused of excessive pricing would 
have to come out with data collected from consumers, for example through market surveys, to 
prove that its product is in fact perceived as different and superior to those offered by 
competitors or used as a comparator. 
The very fact that we evoke the recourse to the same "structure" of the presumption used 
for predatory pricing is a symptom, in itself, of the importance that administrative simplification 
plays in the enforcement of antitrust policy.  
Yet, this is hardly something peculiar to this area of the law: like many other context in 
which the law is not able to capture ex ante through a detailed picture if a particular conduct falls 
in the box of legality or illegality, so international taxation needs to refer to some guidelines for 
                                                
126 Art. 82 EC Treaty. 
127 A presumption which, as seen above, can be rebutted by the defendant providing additional evidence to that 
effect. 
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administrative simplification purposes. As a result, the need to simplify -sometimes even brutally 
simplifying- complex economic concepts to be performed in order to make them working 
regulation, assessment and decision tools is another issue common to both antitrust and 
international taxation.  
In the realm of transfer pricing, a patent example is the very notion of “arm’s length 
dealing”. This definition may be appear as a self explaining and empirical one, that is, that 
entities belonging to the same multinational group should carry out transactions between 
themselves as if they were independent enterprises. However such a “counter-factual” approach 
implies an in-depth understanding of how competitive markets work and seem to incorporate a 
bias according to which we have to assume that markets out there operate in a perfectly 
competitive fashion.  
Moreover, speaking about arm’s length transactions would seem slightly out of scope: 
namely, properties that apply to markets cannot be applied sic et simpliciter  to transactions: a 
competitive market is an aggregation of many transactions whose consolidated outcome satisfies 
some given economic properties, however there is no reason to assume that the overall properties 
applying to a whole market shall be directly detected in isolated transactions. 
Such a reflection leads us to another key issue where it seems that competition law has 
something to teach to tax law, or at least to the way the OECD has been constantly interpreting 
transfer pricing issues: setting the focus on single transactions. Instead of focusing on a 
transaction-based approach, when dealing when competition law driven price analysis, both the 
American and European Courts have been consistently adopting an enlarged perspective based 
on aggregated variables. So, for example, all of the cases discussed above in the context of 
excessive pricing arose out of a series of transactions where an allegedly excessive price was 
charged. Even though in theory an individual transaction would be sufficient to trigger the 
application of the rule, the practice shows that this has never occurred. And in the case of 
predatory pricing,  it is even more unlikely that a single transaction with artificially low price 
gives rise to competitive concern for the basic reason that, even in case of markets characterized 
by large and powerful buyers, firms do not base their sales plans on one single transaction and 
thus the predator would not be able to drive competitors out of the market in absence of a series 
of such transactions. 
A similar sort of simplifying approach developed within the context of transfer pricing, 
even though with some degree of caution and suspicion, is the envisaging of “safe harbors”, a 
system which allows firms featuring given subjective requisites to handle uncertainty, which, 
both in transfer pricing and in competition law-driven price monitoring, is an extremely critical 
issue for firms. 
A further area of inquiry where comparisons between tax law driven transfer pricing 
assessment and competition law driven excessive pricing/predatory pricing assessments can be 
profitably set forth with respect to the question whether the relationship between public 
authorities and firms can be rendered more co-operative and set in a general scenario of mutual 
understanding based on shared bona fide.  
In the realm of international taxation, the answer would seem to be a resounding yes: at 
least in theory, the whole concept of A.P.A., possibly the major transfer pricing innovation in 
recent years, is based on such a conceptual platform. Nonetheless, when it comes to practice, it 
appears that only a handful of Countries has implemented bilateral or multilateral A.P.A.s, often 
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with great difficulty and without achieving the expected deflating effects on the mass of transfer 
pricing based litigation cases that keep tax courts worldwide busy.  
Within the context of competition law, a system akin to A.P.A.s would seem to appear 
less workable, as, at least in theory, the safeguard of a healthy functioning of the markets is 
perceived as a non negotiable matter. In practice, however,  this distinction does not hold entirely 
true since competition authorities do in fact retain some discretion as to the scope and 
prioritization of their enforcement actions. As a result, the introduction of a co-operative 
procedure for the determination of “fair prices” that more closely resembles A.P.A. cannot be a 
priori excluded. The provision of settlement procedures128 both in the US and in the EU and the 
successful results witnessed following the introduction of leniency programs into nearly every 
competition law regime are positive sign in that direction.   
The issues of certainty and of the Public Authority – private firms relationships are 
directly linked to the procedural matter referring to how the burden of proof is allocated. In this 
respect, it would seem that the approaches adopted by international tax law and by competition 
law differ to a remarkable extent.  
Namely, in the context of transfer pricing, proofs are rarely factual based but, rather, are 
the result of an inductive reasoning centered on the most logical and most accurate interpretation 
and application of the transfer pricing guidelines of reference.  
On the contrary, when examining excessive pricing or predatory pricing cases, it seems 
that the factual element is preponderant and this exacerbates the asymmetry already resulting 
from the circumstance that the burden of proof with regard to the most critical issues (i.e., 
objective justifications and miscellaneous defenses) typically lies on the firms. Such a different 
notion of “proof” seems again to be rooted in the circumstance that transfer pricing can benefit 
from a set of almost generally universally accepted guidelines, very analytical in their structure. 
On the contrary, parties dealing with excessive pricing or predatory pricing matters cannot really 
rely on any such piece of guidance, due to the fact that soft law has not been adequately 
developing in this area of competition law. 
Here we come the conclusion of our interdisciplinary work. The issues we have raised 
here represent a list that is far from exhaustive, but may serve to stimulate some reflection in the 
two cognate communities of tax law and competition law scholars, practitioners and officials. As 
it clearly appears, there is major room for cross-pollination between these two fields. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
128 Within an EU context,  rectius, “commitments”, see Art. 9 of Regulation 1/2003. 
